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The human brain carries out a broad array of functions, and there is ample 
evidence that it is the cerebral cortex, taking up three quarters of the brain's volume, that 
plays a central role in perception, cognition, and behavior. However, notwithstanding the 
variety and complexity of the tasks performed by the cerebral cortex, its structure is fairly 
regular (Hubel & Wiesel, 1968; Mountcastle, 1978; Rockel et al, 1980; Mountcastle, 
1997; Hirsch & Martinez; 2006; however, see DeFelipe et al, 2002; Herculano-Housel et 
al, 2008). All areas of cortex have a laminar structure that is typically divided into six 
layers, each with stereotypical patterns of connectivity and cell type concentrations. 
Crossing perpendicular to the layer structure are vertically aligned patterns of 
connectivity by which groups of ~100 cells are densely interconnected. These columns 
(also known as minicolumns) are often theorized to make up cortical “micro-circuits”, 
individual functional units. Cells within a single minicolumn typically have similar 
receptive fields and response properties, leading to the hypothesis that each minicolumn 
acts as an individual pattern recognizer or feature detector. Connectivity and receptive 
field characteristics also indicate a larger columnar organization, often called the 
hypercolumn, which is made up of ~100 minicolumns. Inhibitory connections between 
the minicolumns within a single hypercolumn supress activity in all but those 
minicolumns that best match their current pattern of input, which facilitates the self-
organization of the minicolumns' receptive fields (Lucke and Bouecke, 2005) and 
produces a sparse re-coding of the input pattern. Different areas of cortex vary in their 
patterns of intra-cortical connectivity, in their inputs from thalamic and other subcortical 
nuclei, in the density of particular cell types, in the thickness of cortical layers, etc., but 
the similarities in architecture between cortical areas and between species is so great as to 
suggest a common underlying structural and functional template that is repeated many 
times, with some modification, throughout the cortex. 
In addition to structural homogeneity, there are other lines of evidence indicating 
a common cortical algorithm that is utilized in a domain general manner. Research on 
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statistical learning (Saffran et al., 1996a, 1996b; Saffran et al., 1999; Kirkham et al., 2002; 
Fiser & Aslin 2002, 2005; Saffran & Wilson, 2003, Ferrier, 2006; Graf Estes et al., 2007) has 
shown that given structured stimuli composed of visual images, speech sounds, or tones, 
both infants and adults will learn the underlying structure in a syntactic (ie., 
compositional and hierarchical) manner. Results across the various domains show very 
similar properties; input is broken up into statistically coherent chunks at the “fault lines” of 
lower predictive probability, and these learned chunks are then made available as 
components for higher level associative learning. 
There is also evidence of a common cortical algorithm from surgical 
manipulation. Functional interchangeability has been demonstrated by an experiment in 
which visual input was surgically rerouted to auditory cortex in neonatal ferrets, and the 
mature animals were able to respond to visual stimuli, with retinotopic maps and typical 
visual receptive fields having developed within their auditory cortex (von Melchner et al., 
2000).  
The plasticity which allows one cortical area to take over the function of a second 
area has been studied extensively (e.g., Feldman, 2009). In a recent example, it was 
shown that the visual cortex of congenitally blind individuals will often come to respond 
to language (Bedny et al., 2011). BOLD imaging and functional connectivity indicate that 
these visual areas become involved in language processing, of the same type normally 
seen only in specific areas of the left frontal and temporal lobes. Vision and language 
have often been considered two of the domains most likely to be processed by specialized 
cortical circuits that have evolved for their particular functions (e.g., Pinker, 1994; 
Callaway, 1998), and yet functional interchangeability is now being seen even between 
cortical areas normally dedicated to these domains. 
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Constraints on a Universal Cortical Algorithm 
 
The prospect that there may be a single underlying process that the cortex applies 
many millions of times, in parallel, and in a domain general manner, is extremely 
attractive. It presents the possibility of understanding in one stroke how the cortex plays 
its central roles in perception, cognition and behavior. However, this also places an 
enormous explanatory burden upon any candidate theory for such a cortical algorithm. In 
recent years there have been an increasing number of attempts to synthesize the growing 
body of knowledge of the details of cortical function into a coherent theory (e.g., 
Grossberg 2007, Rodriguez et al., 2005; Hecht-Nielsen, 2007; Bastos et al., 2012), but no 
such theory has yet materialized that is clearly able to explain the full diversity of cortical 
functions. Nonetheless, many constraints and hints have emerged as to the shape this 
common algorithm may take, both from the computational level (Marr, 1982), in the form 
of mathematical models of learning and information processing, and from the 
implementation level, in the form of the advancing knowledge of cortical 
neurophysiology, neuroanatomy and connectivity. In this section, I will review several 
diverse but complementary areas of research that, taken together, begin to paint a picture 
of how a universal cortical algorithm may work. 
Sparse Distributed Representation 
One of the most fundamental aspects of cortical function is the way in which 
knowledge about the world is represented by the activity of cells within a region of 
cortex. The spectrum of possibilities begins with the localist representation, in which the 
activity of a single cell corresponds to a given percept or concept. At the other end of the 
spectrum is the dense distributed representation, in which the activity of a large fraction 
(up to ~50%) of cells within an area acts as a representation. Between these two extremes 
is the sparse distributed representation, in which the activity of a small fraction of the cell 
population within an area acts as a representation. 
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Distributed representation offers many advantages over localist representation 
(Hinton, 1986). Because distributed representation is combinatorial, storage capacity 
increases exponentially as the number of units grows; with localist representation, storage 
capacity increases only linearly with the number of units. Distributed representation 
facilitates generalization among representations based on the degree of overlap between 
their respective patterns of activity. The activity of the individual units that make up a 
distributed representation may have meaning on their own, which allows for semantically 
relevant overlap between various representations. For example, a representation's pattern 
of activity may be made up of subpatterns that represent classes in a type hierarchy, or 
sub-parts in a compositional relationship. With distributed representation, new 
representations can differentiate themselves progressively by gradual weight 
modifications, whereas localist representations are formed abruptly and discretely. 
Finally, by virtue of their redundancy, distributed representations are more fault tolerant 
than localist representations.   
Among distributed representations, a sparse distribution of activity confers most 
of the same advantages as a dense distribution, while avoiding several of its drawbacks 
(Foldiak, 2002; Willshaw and Dayan, 1990). While the representational capacity of a 
sparse representation is very high, the representational capacity of a dense representation 
is much higher still — in fact unnecessarily high, resulting in a great degree of 
redundancy between representations. The high information content of dense distributed 
representations make associative mappings between representations much more complex. 
The mappings would generally not be linearly separable, and so would require multilayer 
networks and learning algorithms that strain biological plausibility. Linear separability is 
much more readily achieved with sparse distributed representations, which allows many 
more associative pairs to be learned by a single layer of connections modified by a 
biologically plausible local Hebbian learning function (Olshausen & Field, 2004). Both 
types of distributed representation support generalization between overlapping patterns, 
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but because the activity of a single unit in a sparse representation has lower probability 
and can therefore be more selective, there is greater opportunity (depending on the 
learning algorithm) for a sparse representation to mix several semantically meaningful 
subpatterns in a combinatorial manner. 
Sparse distributed representations, therefore, have a number of computational 
advantages over the alternatives. And in fact, studies have begun to reveal cortical cell 
response properties consistent with sparse distributed representations (Olshausen & Field, 
2004). Sparse patterns of activity corresponding with sensory input have been observed 
in rat auditory and somatosensory cortex and in the insect olfactory system. Sparse 
activity has been recorded in motor cortex accompanying the initiation of movement. 
Sparse activity has also been observed in primate V1 when the subject is exposed to 
natural visual scenes. Interestingly, when provided with stimulation only within their own 
receptive fields, these same V1 cells become more densely active, indicating that context 
affects the degree of sparseness of activity. This point will be relevant to the discussions 
in later sections of predictive coding and hierarchical temporal memory. 
The low probability of activation and narrow selectivity of the preferred stimulus 
of individual cells in higher visual areas support the hypothesis that neural 
representations there are sparse, and that elements of those representations are 
meaningful in and of themselves, representing e.g. complex shapes, object components, 
and faces (Gross et al., 1972; Perrett et al., 1982; Tanaka, 1996; Foldiak, 2002). Zhang et 
al. (2011) recorded responses from ~200 monkey IT cells and used a classifier to identify 
the sparse activity patterns corresponding to each of several visual objects shown in 
isolation. These patterns carried information specific to both the identity and position of 
the objects. When several of these objects were then displayed simultaneously and 
peripherally, the resulting pattern of activity contained information about the identity and 
position of each of the objects, though in a reduced form compared with when the objects 
were shown in isolation. When attention was then covertly directed to only one of the 
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several objects being displayed, cell activity representing information about that object 
increased, at the expense of activity corresponding to the unattended objects. These 
results indicate sparse representation of object identity and position in IT, with 
representations of individual sub-parts of a scene being combined compositionally, and 
with the degree of representation of these various sub-parts being modulated by attention. 
Computational models have also supported the hypothesis that sparse distributed 
representations are used by the cortex. Field (1987) and Olshausen and Field (1996) 
found that when the receptive fields of an entire group of units is optimized to produce 
sparse representations when trained on natural visual scenes, the units develop response 
properties similar to those of V1 simple cells. Sparse coding also meets the brain's energy 
efficiency requirements; Lennie (2003) found that given its energy usage constraints, less 
than 2% of the brain's neurons could afford to be significantly active at any given time. 
Bayesian Inference 
Visual perception has traditionally been considered mainly in terms of 
feedforward processing, with increasingly complex and abstract representations at each 
level building upon the activity of the previous level, while top-down feedback is 
primarily relegated to the modulation of attention (Marr, 1982; Felleman & Van Essen, 
1991; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Alternately, a number of theories have proposed that 
feedback may instead provide contextual priors to influence inference at lower levels 
(McClelland & Rumelhart, 1980; Carpenter & Grossberg, 1987; Mumford, 1992; Rao & 
Ballard, 1997). If this is the case, then attention, seen as biased competition within a 
cortical region, may be just one aspect of a process of biased inference that is mediated 
by top-down feedback. Building on pattern theory (Grenander, 1993), Lee and Mumford 
(2002) proposed that a cortical hierarchy performs Bayesian belief propagation. In this 
view, a cortical area treats its bottom-up input (from sensory thalamus or from 
hierarchically lower cortical areas) as evidence, which it combines with top-down inputs 
from higher cortical areas that are treated as Bayesian contextual priors, in order to 
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determine its most probable hypotheses and to activate their representations. Over time, 
the region moves toward an equilibrium in which the optimum set of representations is 
activated, in order to maximize the probability of the active representations given both 
the bottom up and top down data. This view has received significant experimental 
support. In cases where direct input differs from perception, as with binocular rivalry or 
illusory contours, or where input is ambiguous and may be perceived in more than one 
way, short latency (100ms-200ms) responses in V1 correspond well with bottom up 
thalamic input, while longer latency responses instead correspond partially with what is 
perceived (Lee & Mumford, 2002). The correspondence of relevant activity with what is 
perceived, rather than with direct input, increases at higher levels of the hierarchy, 
starting at 10% in V1 and 20% in V2, through to nearly 100% in IT (Logothetis, 1998). 
The Bayesian belief propagation hypothesis makes sense of these result and others, while 
providing a biologically plausible framework through which the cortex may implement 
hierarchical Bayesian inference.  
Deep Learning 
Deep learning architectures (Hinton, 2006; Bengio, 2009) exploit the assumption 
that the generating causes underlying observations about the world are organized 
compositionally or categorically into multiple hierarchical levels, and that higher level 
representations can build upon combinations and transformations of lower level 
representations. These architectures generally use a combination of supervised and 
unsupervised learning to extract statistical regularities at each level, passing the 
transformed input representation up to the next level where further regularities may be 
extracted. Each layer of the network acts as a filter, capturing a subset of regularities 
from the input signal, and so reducing the dimensionality of the data. For example, when 
applied to visual object recognition problems, a deep learning architecture may learn 
representations at the lowest level that correspond to lines and edges; at the next higher 
level it may learn representations corresponding to corners and intersections of lines; at 
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the next level it may represent parts of objects, and so on. Deep learning networks have 
recently produced exceptional results with several classes of pattern recognition tasks, in 
some cases achieving human-level performance for the first time (e.g., Ciresan et al., 
2012a/2012b/2012c). They are also modeled on cortical processing, which uses a 
hierarchically organized series of regions to extract increasingly compositionally 
complex and categorically abstract representations from perceptual input. 
Multi-Stage Hubel Wiesel Architectures 
Hierarchical models of cortical function have their roots in the pioneering work of 
Hubel and Wiesel (1962, 1968), who studied cell response properties in primary visual 
cortex (V1). They identified two basic patterns of response properties in V1 cells; simple 
cells respond mostly to lines of a particular orientation, spatial frequency, and position, 
while complex cells introduce some degree of invariance to position. This pattern was 
found to be repeated in later regions in the visual hierarchy, with simple cells that would 
respond to a spatial pattern but with increasing complexity at each level, and complex 
cells that at each level would introduce a greater degree of invariance to position and 
scale. A series of models of the ventral visual stream (involved in object recognition) 
have been developed based on these findings, for which Ranzato et al. (2007) introduced 
the term multi-stage Hubel-Wiesel architectures (MHWA). These include the 
Neocognitron (Fukushima, 1988), convolutional networks (Chellapilla et al., 2006; 
Ciresan et al., 2011),  and HMAX (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999; Serre et al., 
2005/2007a/2007b). MHWA models are composed of alternating layers of conjunctive 
and disjunctive units. The conjunctive units perform template matching, responding to a 
particular combination of inputs from the previous layer, such as a contrasting edge at a 
particular orientation and position (often described using a Gabor filter function). The 
disjunctive units are wired to respond when any of several related conjunctive units from 
a local area in the previous layer are active, for example when any unit is active that 
represents a given line orientation and spatial frequency, but at any position within a local 
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range. Each disjunctive unit pools over a particular set of conjunctive input units. In this 
way the disjunctive units introduce a measure of position and scale invariance. The 
disjunctive unit layer then feeds into a second conjunctive unit layer, which learns to 
respond to specific combinations of those partially invariant representations, and so on. 
The result is that, over the course of several levels, representations are learned that are 
selective to individual whole objects but are also invariant to changes in position and 
scale. 
Like other MHWA models, HMAX only attempts to model the feedforward 
aspect of visual object recognition, representing the first ~100 ms of processing after 
stimulus onset. Its biologically motivated combination of a deep architecture with the 
alternating conjunctive and disjunctive layers that introduce position and scale invariance 
have allowed it to rival the performance of both humans (Serre et al., 2007b) and cutting 
edge computer vision techniques (Serre et al., 2007a) in fast object recognition tasks. 
However while HMAX accurately models, and in some cases has predicted (Serre et al., 
2005), response properties of several types of cell in visual areas of the cortex (as well as 
imaging and psychophysical results), it does not address how all of those response 
properties may develop in the first place. Specifically, HMAX's disjunctive units are 
hard-wired to the particular set of conjunctive units that they pool over, in order to 
respond invariantly to the activity of any of those conjunctive units and so introduce 
spatial and scale invariance; these connections are set parametrically, rather than through 
a learning process. While some cortical connection strengths are very likely programmed 
genetically (Markram & Perin, 2011), if cortical complex cells correspond in their 
properties to HMAX's disjunctive units it may be impractical for their input connections 
to be formed other than by a learning process, since the response properties of the simple 
cells that provide their inputs would themselves be learned. The HMAX model remains 
agnostic to the nature of this learning process. 
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When considering HMAX as a candidate for a universal model of cortical 
function, it has several additional shortcomings. The response properties of its pooling 
disjunctive cells are based closely on the complex cells in visual regions of cortex, and as 
such are specialized for producing position and scale invariance. It is unclear what role 
the disjunctive layers may play in non-visual cortical functions. In addition, there are 
other cortical functions such as the representation of temporal sequences, crucial for 
auditory and motor processing, that are not modeled at all within the HMAX framework. 
Even within the domain of visual object recognition, HMAX relies on a separate, 
supervised mechanism to learn other types of invariance, such as pose, rotation and 
lighting invariance. HMAX is very successful as a model of certain aspects of the ventral 
visual stream, but it does not represent a universal model of cortical function.  
Temporal Slowness 
Connectionist models are typically trained either in an unsupervised manner, 
often using some form of Hebbian learning to produce associations between inputs that 
co-occur, or else in a supervised manner, using an error driven gradient descent learning 
method such as backpropagation (Rumelhart et al, 1986) to produce associations between 
arbitrary pairs of inputs (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000). One reason visual invariance 
problems are difficult is because they are not easily solved by either of these methods. 
Two input patterns representing the same object with some variation in position (or scale, 
rotation, etc.) may be separated by a very large Euclidean distance, while two patterns 
representing different objects may be much closer. Hebbian learning is very sensitive to 
shared structure, and so would be unable to make the correct classifications in such a 
case. Error driven learning has been proven more capable of making the correct 
discriminations, but is not very good at generalizing these discriminations beyond its 
training set. An error driven convolutional network requires a large number of training 
examples per class (Ranzato et al., 2007),  whereas the primate visual system can often 
discriminate similar objects after just a few training examples. Error driven learning, 
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being supervised, is also arguably not biologically plausible as a form of basic perceptual 
learning, because there are no category labels in the real world to act as supervisor. 
In recent years several new approaches have made headway toward solving this 
problem, using the principle of temporal slowness (Berkes, 2005; Földiák, 1991; 
Mitchison, 1991). Temporal slowness is based on the idea that sensory data changes on a 
much more rapid timescale than do the relevant properties of the world. While the 
identities of nearby objects and their configuration in the environment tend to change 
only gradually, the visual input reflecting that environment can change markedly from 
one moment to the next, due for example to the movement of objects or a change in view 
angle. Ideally the brain's internal representation of the environment would change at the 
same timescale that the environment itself changes, rather than at the timescale in which 
its sensory input changes. Temporal slowness takes advantage of the fact that the many 
possible visual impressions that can be projected by an individual object make up a 
single, contiguous manifold in the high dimensional space of visual input (DiCarlo & 
Cox, 2007). Because of this, different visual impressions of the same object will tend to 
transform continuously from one to another, tracing a path on that manifold. Therefore 
visual impressions that occur close to one another in time with high probability will tend 
to represent two nearby points on the same object's manifold. This information can be 
used to learn invariant representations in an unsupervised manner, or rather by using time 
as a supervisor; those input representations that tend to occur adjacently in time are 
transformed into a common, invariant output representation. This is exactly the kind of 
learning required by a MHWA such as HMAX, in order to set the connection weights 
between conjunctive (simple) and disjunctive (complex) cells in each layer. 
This principle can be applied in a variety of ways. Foldiak (1991) and Wallis and 
Rolls (1996) built models of V1 in which the connections between simple and complex 
cells used a modified Hebbian learning rule that based the magnitude of learning on the 
product of the current activation strength of the presynaptic simple cell with a measure of 
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the activity over time of the postsynaptic complex cell, using either a short term memory 
trace or a running average. The result is that the complex cell comes to be associated with 
a group of simple cells that respond to the same visual input but under various 
transformations, such as changes in position and scale, that result in input patterns that 
occur sequentially with high probability in the training data. After training, the model's 
complex cells exhibited the classical complex response properties of orientation 
discrimination with phase (position) invariance. Wiskott and Sejnowski (2002) 
introduced slow feature analysis, which restates the temporal slowness principle as a 
nonlinear optimization problem, in which, given an input signal, it will find the functions 
that will produce those output signals that vary most slowly over time, while still carrying 
significant information. Slow feature analysis produces a set of uncorrelated outputs that 
vary most slowly in time. When trained with inputs based on V1 simple cells, its results 
model the receptive field properties of V1 complex cells very closely, including extra-
classical properties such as selectivity to direction of movement, end-inhibition, side-
inhibition, and variations in orientation and frequency specificity (Berkes, 2005). Unlike 
the earlier models, however, slow feature analysis remains a mathematical algorithm; 
there is not yet a biological theory for how it may be implemented by the cortex. 
A growing body of evidence indicates that the ventral visual stream uses temporal 
slowness to learn invariant response properties. Miyashita (1988) trained monkeys on a 
repeating series of fractal images, and found that some IT cells learned to respond 
invariantly to several visually distinct images that had appeared consecutively within the 
training set. Wallis and Bulthoff (2001) presented human subjects with smooth 
animations of a human head rotating from side to side. As it did so, the face displayed on 
this head would switch to that of a different person. Subjects would later identify two 
different faces as belonging to the same individual, if they had occurred in temporal 
sequence on the same rotating head during training. Cox et al. (2005) were able to 'break' 
position invariance in human subjects by manipulating the transformation of visual input 
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over time. A visual object would be presented in peripheral vision, and the subject would 
then saccade to view the object directly. While the saccade was taking place, the object 
would be swapped out with a similar but visually distinct object. This training regimen 
resulted in specific confusions suggesting that the images of different objects at various 
retinal positions came to be associated with a common spatially invariant representation. 
Li and DiCarlo (2008) confirmed this interpretation by presenting monkeys with a similar 
object-swap training regimen. Some IT cells developed response properties that were 
invariant to both multiple positions and multiple object identities, for those cases where 
an object's identity was switched during saccade. These experimental results support the 
idea that temporal slowness is used to train the response properties of complex cells in 
the ventral visual stream, to produce position invariance. Temporal slowness therefore 
presents a credible solution to the question of how the disjunctive cell properties in a 
MHWA model such as HMAX may be learned (Masquelier et al., 2007). It also suggests 
that temporal slowness is instrumental in producing invariance to more complex 
transformations, such as rotation and pose, for which HMAX has relied on supervised, 
error-driven learning. 
Predictive Coding 
Another way in which cortical processing may utilize temporal information 
derived from its inputs is in the generation of predictions. A large body of experimental 
evidence has shown that, following training with temporal sequences of sensory stimuli, 
BOLD response is greater when a stimulus violates the temporal pattern established by 
prior training, than when a stimulus is consistent with that learned pattern. This effect has 
been seen with natural images (Hupe´ et al., 1998; Bair et al., 2003), auditory streams 
(Garrido et al., 2007, 2009; Todorovic et al., 2011), apparent motion of visual stimuli 
(Alink et al., 2010), hierarchical organization of auditory streams (Wacongne et al., 
2011), and so on. Colby et al (1996) recorded the responses of parietal neurons during 
saccade, and found that these neurons first activate in representation of the expected new 
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visual scene immediately before the saccade takes place, and then update to represent the 
actual new scene once the saccade is complete. Kok et al. (2012) found that prior 
expectation of a visual stimulus not only reduces the amplitude of the neural response to 
that stimulus in V1, but also improves the informational quality of its representation.  
According to the predictive coding hypothesis (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Srinivasan 
et al., 1982), a cortical region learns temporal models of its input and uses these models 
to continuously generate predictions based on its current input in the context of its prior 
inputs. Prediction errors are then used to update the learned models. The predictive 
coding hypothesis accounts for the decreased activity due to predicted stimuli, as well as 
for simple repetition suppression and priming effects (Friston, 2005). Rao and Ballard 
(1999) introduced a hierarchical model of predictive coding, whereby each level of cortex 
generates top-down predictions which are compared with novel input at a lower level. 
Only the difference between the two, the prediction error, is transmitted back up to the 
higher level. Bastos et al. (2012) have elaborated this into a detailed model of canonical 
cortical circuits, finding that the computational requirements line up well with anatomical 
and functional data. De-Wit et al. (2010) note however that it still remains unclear 
whether predictions are updated at a higher level and passed down to a lower level, or 
else maintained and updated within a single level. Regardless of the specific mechanisms 
involved, the predictive coding hypothesis has been rapidly gaining traction as 
accounting neatly for many different sources of experimental data, and its application has 
also been extended beyond perception to cognition and mental disorders (Bar, 2009). 
In review, there is compelling evidence that the various areas of cerebral cortex 
all implement a common algorithm. Several lines of evidence point to sparse distributed 
representation as the medium of encoding used by this algorithm. There are indications 
that one of the roles performed by this algorithm can be characterized as hierarchical 
Bayesian inference. Biologically grounded models of visual cortex such as HMAX 
propose alternating layers of conjunctive units that provide specificity by responding to 
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particular patterns of input, and disjunctive units that provide invariance by responding 
when any of a number of connected conjunctive units from the previous layer are active. 
The principle of temporal slowness holds that the underlying external causes of sensory 
input vary more slowly over time than does the raw sensory input that is projected from 
those causes, and that meaningful and behaviorally relevant representations can be 
formed by extracting those more temporally stable statistical regularities from the sensory 
input. Temporal slowness can be exploited to train the input connections of disjunctive 
units such as those of the HMAX model in an unsupervised manner. Finally, growing 
support for the predictive coding hypothesis indicates that the cortex uses temporal 
information not only for extracting meaningful invariances, but also for recording 
sequences and making predictions. 
 
Hierarchical Temporal Memory 
 
The set of functional constraints described above can be combined with 
constraints derived from anatomical and other biological data to approach the problem of 
specifying precisely what processes make up the common cortical algorithm, and how 
they are implemented by neuronal circuitry. Hierarchical temporal memory (HTM) is a 
family of learning models and corresponding theories of cortical function that seeks to 
address this problem by building upon those constraints. HTM is based on Hawkin's 
(2004) memory-prediction framework, which views the cortex as a bi-directional 
hierarchy of regions that learn not only co-occurring patterns of input, but also sequences 
of those patterns. These learned sequences are used to constantly generate predictions of 
future input, predictions that are passed down to lower levels so as to bias the activity in 
those levels toward representing input in a way consistent with the ongoing predictions. 
So long as a region's input is well predicted, that region's feed-forward output remains 
relatively stable — outputting a pattern that essentially acts as a constant 'name' for the 
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current sequence, with which higher level regions may build further patterns and 
sequences. In this way, at increasingly higher levels of the hierarchy, patterns of activity 
will tend to become increasingly stable over time. From this perspective, the spatially 
invariant complex cells in visual cortex (the disjunctive cells in the HMAX model) are 
responding predictively; if a particular feature is seen at a given location, there's a high 
probability that it will be seen at a nearby location soon. 
HTM refers to a number of related computational models based on the memory-
prediction framework, as well as the cortical theories underlying those models. The first 
iteration of HTM (George & Hawkins, 2005; George & Hawkins 2009) builds explicitly 
upon a Bayesian belief propagation learning model, and is made up of representations 
that correspond to patterns of activity and sequences of patterns within a cortical region. 
This version of HTM has the strength of being well characterized mathematically, but 
also has several weaknesses deriving from its abstract level of representation. The second 
iteration of HTM (Hawkins et al., 2010) is based in much greater detail on its underlying 
cortical model, with representations corresponding to individual columns, cells, and 
dendrite segments. While this version does not map as transparently as the first version to 
the mathematics of Bayesian inference, it gains the advantages of sparse distributed 
representations (Hinton, 1984; Földiák, 2002) and borrows from several well understood 
neural network approaches. 
In considering the use of HTM as a provisional model of cortical function, it 
would be useful to review the various iterations of HTM in greater detail and examine 
their strengths and weaknesses. 
The Zeta 1 Implementation of HTM 
In its first iteration (sometimes called Zeta 1), an HTM learning system consists 
of a hierarchical tree of basic computational units called nodes, each of which is 
analogous to an area of cortex. The processing that is performed by each node is 
separated into two stages. The first stage, called the spatial pooler, learns and represents 
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spatial patterns: co-occurrences of particular inputs from its child nodes. The second 
stage, the temporal pooler, learns and represents sequences of those spatial patterns. The 
feed-forward output from a node represents the set of those temporal sequences that are 
inferred to have the highest probability of representing the node's current input. Because 
the spatial pooler of each node in the hierarchy learns spatial patterns representing the 
simultaneous activity of a number of neighboring child nodes, and because the temporal 
pooler learns sequences of those spatial patterns that occur with high probability, 
representations at higher levels in the hierarchy will generally represent larger areas of 
space and longer durations of time than those at lower levels. At higher levels of the 
hierarchy, activity varies more slowly and is increasingly stable over time. In this way an 
HTM hierarchy manifests the principle of temporal slowness. 
In the Zeta 1 implementation of HTM, learning occurs in each hierarchical level 
of nodes separately and sequentially. That is, the lowest level of nodes will perform 
learning first. After being sufficiently trained, nodes at this level will then stop learning 
and switch to performing inference, while nodes at the second level will begin learning. 
Because the input to each level of the HTM hierarchy is given in terms of active sequence 
representations from the immediately lower level of nodes, it is required that the 
repertoire of nodes at one level be stabilized before learning may begin at the next level. 
This requirement precludes online learning and is clearly at odds with the performance of 
the actual cortex.  
A node's spatial pooler learns representations of patterns of co-occurring inputs. 
When performing inference, the representations of the pattern or patterns that most 
closely match the current input are activated. In its simplest instantiation, the spatial 
pooler will simply memorize each separate pattern of coinciding inputs that occurs. In 
real world situations this is usually impractical because it would lead to the creation of 
too many individual representations. This problem is effectively solved by recording only 
a fixed number of coincidence patterns, randomly selected from the full set of input 
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patterns, and then allowing more than one pattern to be active at one time, resulting in a 
sparse distributed activation of coincidence patterns that, as an ensemble, approximates 
the actual current input pattern. 
A node's temporal pooler learns representations of commonly occurring 
sequences of those coincidence patterns learned by the spatial pooler. Each sequence is 
recorded as a Markov chain that represents a series of coincident patterns that occur 
sequentially in time with high probability. A number of different methods have been used 
to learn the mixture of Markov chains; a simple technique is to learn a transition matrix 
for the various coincidence patterns and to use a graph partitioning algorithm to identify a 
set of groups representing the highest probability sequences. 
To perform inference, HTM nodes use Bayesian belief propagation (Pearl, 1988). 
At each time step, a child node passes a message to its parent node indicating the degree 
of certainty over each of the child node's Markov chains. The parent node uses this 
information to determine its own likelihood values for each of its coincidence patterns. 
By making use of the history of messages received (which is collapsed into a state 
variable that is updated at each time step), the parent node then determines its degree of 
certainty over each of its Markov chains (ie., it determines which sequences have the 
highest probability of currently being played out). This information is then passed feed-
forward to the node's own parent node. A node also passes back to its child nodes the 
degree of certainty determined for each of its child node's Markov chains. A node 
receiving this feedback message then combines it with its feed-forward likelihood values 
to determine the belief distribution over its own coincidence patterns. In this way bottom-
up and top-down information is combined at each level to determine the spatial 
coincidence patterns and the temporal Markov chains that are believed most likely to 
correspond to the external causes of the network's input. The belief propagation equations 
used at each step are examined in detail in (George & Hawkins, 2009). 
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HTM is an attempt to bridge the gap between a learning framework of spatio-
temporal Bayesian belief propagation and cortical function, and so a biologically 
grounded cortical circuit model is provided for each step of the learning and inference 
processes. In this model, each cortical column responds to a particular coincidence 
pattern. It is hypothesized that a column's layer 4 pyramidal cells receive weighted inputs 
from neurons representing each of that pattern's constituents at the lower level. Columns 
mutually inhibit their neighbors, and this competition sharpens the selectivity of the 
pattern learned by each column. This type of competitive Hebbian learning process is 
typical of many connectionist models of cortex that perform feature detection or vector 
quantization (e.g., Kohonen, 1982; Rumelhart & Zipser, 1985; Churchland & Sejnowski, 
1992; Tsunoda et al., 2001; Buzo et al, 1980).  
It is its temporal learning properties that set HTM apart from other models. 
Within a column are also a second set of cells (posited to be layer 2/3 pyramidal cells) 
representing the column's coincidence pattern in the context of each of the various 
sequences (Markov chains) in which it may occur. These cells receive lateral input from 
cells in other columns, which are active in response to other spatial patterns that are part 
of the same Markov chain. These contextual cells are driven by the weighted sum of this 
lateral input multiplied by the input from the column's cells that are active in response to 
the column's spatial pattern being active in any context. Thus each of these contextual 
cells is activated only when its column's spatial pattern is active within the temporal 
context represented by a single Markov chain.  
A third type of neuron (also hypothesized to be located in layers 2/3) receives 
input from all cells that belong to a single Markov chain, regardless of which spatial 
pattern within that Markov chain's sequence that they represent. These cells are active 
whenever any spatial pattern within the chain (any step within the sequence) is active. By 
pooling the output of all cells that represent any step within a single Markov chain, these 
cells perform the role of the disjunctive layer in an HMAX network. It is these cells that 
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send their output feed-forward to the next higher layer (the parent node) in the network. 
Two additional neuron types (located in layers 5 and 6) are hypothesized to handle the 
functions of top-down message passing. The biological evidence that provides 
justifications for the hypothesized mappings of HTM's belief propagation equations to 
cortical circuits is reviewed in (George & Hawkins, 2009), along with a set of predictions 
derived from the model and an examination of possible variations. 
The Zeta 1 version of HTM has several fundamental weaknesses (George & 
Hawkins, 2009; Maltoni 2011). The first of these weaknesses is in the rigidity of its 
representations. A Zeta 1 node's spatial representations consist of discrete coincidence 
patterns that each record a specific set of co-occurring inputs. Each such coincidence 
pattern represents the entire state of the input to that node. This presents several 
problems: every meaningful variation of input state would need to be represented by a 
separate coincidence pattern, resulting in the generation of very large numbers of 
coincidence patterns when given rich input data; there is no means of generalization that 
would allow learning associated with one input pattern to be utilized by a similar second 
input pattern; and there is no support for compositionality, whereby multiple separate 
subpatterns of input may be active at one time. Several partial solutions to these problems 
were implemented in Zeta 1. The profusion of coincidence patterns that would result 
from storing every individual input pattern was addressed by storing only a fixed number 
of different coincidence patterns, and activating the pattern that most closely matches the 
input. The lack of support for compositionality and generalization was in part addressed 
by allowing multiple coincidence patterns, each being a partial match to the current input, 
to be active at one time, resulting in a sparse distributed representation that would 
approximate the actual input. Topologically organized compositionality, such as the 
activation of many different patterns representing individual localized features in V1, was 
addressed by splitting the representation of a single cortical area into many separate HTM 
nodes with overlapping receptive fields. 
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Related to the problem of the rigidity of its representations, the Zeta 1 
implementation is incapable of online learning. Learning must begin at the lowest level of 
the hierarchy, where the spatial representations (coincidence patterns) are learned first, 
followed by the temporal representations (Markov chains) that build upon those spatial 
representations. Learning then proceeds for the next higher hierarchical level, and so on. 
Because each level of representation is built in terms of the representations at the 
previous level, learning must cease at one level so that its representations become stable, 
before learning can begin at the next level. An HTM network can only begin to be used 
for inference after learning has been completed at all levels in series. 
A third important weakness in the Zeta 1 version of HTM is with the temporal 
properties of the method in which a Markov chain's probability is determined during 
inference. Originally (George, 2008), the probability of a Markov chain was based only 
on the immediate probabilities determined for the spatial coincidence patterns at the 
current time step, with no regard given to the sequence of prior states. This method would 
result in first order predictions based only on current activity, which works well for 
modeling spatial invariance but does not successfully model temporal sequences except 
in the simplest case where each coincidence pattern takes part in only a single temporal 
sequence. This system was later modified (George & Hawkins, 2009) to take into account 
the sequence of previously active coincidence patterns (as well as the currently active 
coincidence patterns) when determining the probability for each Markov chain. This 
system was capable of both modeling spatial invariance and of making nth-order 
sequence predictions based on prior context, but it could only represent sequences that 
advance at a constant speed, one step per time tick.  
The Zeta 1 implementation also does not address some important aspects of 
cortical function at all. Top-down feedback is used only to implement the Bayesian belief 
propagation equations, and does not affect a node's feedforward output. Therefore it is 
insufficient to model the role of feedback in selective attention. Finally there is no 
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attempt to model the motor output function of cortical layer 5, with the timing and gating 
functions this would require. 
The HTM Cortical Learning Algorithms 
Many of the problems discussed above were addressed in the second iteration of 
HTM, called the cortical learning algorithms (CLA). The CLA is based on a model of 
cortical function similar to Zeta 1's, and at a high level it embodies most of the same 
learning principles as Zeta 1. However, the CLA employs entirely different algorithms 
and representations, implementing its model of cortical function at a more granular and 
biologically detailed level of abstraction.  
The basic units of representation in the CLA correspond to cortical regions, 
cortical minicolumns, cells within those columns, and dendritic branches. Following the 
biological model, each column is considered to represent, and to activate most strongly 
and selectively to, a particular subpattern of inputs. As a simplification of biological 
detail, each column is given a single dendrite segment through which it receives input 
from lower hierarchical levels. This is termed a proximal segment, because it corresponds 
to a layer 4 neuron's dendrites that are close to the cell body, where they receive 
feedforward input from axons projected from neurons in lower cortical regions. A 
column's proximal segment receives input from a random subset of all inputs that project 
to its cortical region, and that subset may be most dense centrally and fall off according 
to a Gaussian function, in order to support topologically mapped inputs.  
At any given time only a sparse subset (e.g. 2%) of columns within a region will 
be active. The spatial pooler stage of the CLA will determine the degree to which the 
subpattern of input represented by each column's proximal dendrite matches the current 
input. Only those within a local area that best match their active input will be activated, 
by way of a k-winners-take-all (kWTA) process intended to model local lateral inhibition 
within a cortical region. Columns which have been least active over time are "boosted" to 
be more sensitive to their inputs and so more strongly competitive with other columns, in 
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order to encourage the participation of all columns within the set of representations and to 
enable the reuse of columns representing input patterns that are no longer common. After 
the inhibition stage, when the final set of active columns has been determined, the 
proximal synapses of only those columns that are active have their synaptic strengths 
modified according to a Hebbian learning rule. The result is that, over the course of 
learning, the activity of each column comes to represent a specific combination of inputs 
that occur with high probability. The CLA's spatial pooler thus implements a form of 
competitive learning (Rumelhart & Zipser, 1986), akin to conditional principal 
component analysis (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) or Kohonen's (1982) self-organizing 
map. In the CLA, columns fill the role of Zeta 1's coincidence patterns, by representing 
individual co-occurrences of inputs. The CLA spatial pooler's learning algorithm solves 
the problem of choosing which limited set of input patterns to represent by using this well 
understood method to converge toward a set of most common subpatterns. The use of a 
sparse distributed representation where each column represents only a small sample of 
the region's full input allows a complete pattern of active inputs to be represented 
approximately in a way that supports generalization and compositionality. 
The CLA's biologically inspired sparse distributed representation of inputs offers 
many advantages over Zeta 1's set of discrete coincidence patterns. However it also 
introduces complexities. Temporal sequences can no longer be represented as Markov 
chains of spatial coincidence patterns, because those spatial patterns are now composed 
of a sparse compositional coding in which a given exact set of columns may rarely if ever 
be active more than one time. Instead, the temporal pooler of the CLA takes a very 
different approach. 
The CLA and Zeta 1 are based on similar theories of cortical function. This theory 
holds that while each cortical column represents a single specific spatial pattern of inputs, 
an individual cell within that column will respond only to that spatial pattern in the 
temporal context of a particular pattern of prior activity within the same cortical region. 
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While Zeta 1 abstracted this model, the CLA implements it explicitly. In the CLA, a cell 
may be inactive, or it may be in one of two states of activity. It may be active, meaning 
that it is currently representing feedforward input, or it may be predictive, meaning that it 
is primed or expecting to be actively representing input soon. In (Hawkins et al., 2010) it 
is hypothesized that the active state corresponds to bursting activity of a cortical 
pyramidal neuron, whereas the predictive state corresponds to tonic firing. (Another 
possible neurophysiological basis for the predictive state, suggested by Hawkins 
(personal communication, May 13, 2013), is with a modified Hebbian synaptic 
modification rule with a short term memory trace, as described by (Wallis & Rolls, 
1997).) A cell is put into predictive state by receiving above-threshold excitatory input 
via a distal dendrite segment. Distal segments project horizontally within layer 1, where 
they receive input from cells in the same cortical region. An individual synaptic 
depolarization on a distal dendrite has very little effect by the time it reaches the soma, 
however multiple simultaneous synaptic depolarizations on the same segment of a distal 
dendrite can trigger the firing of the receiving cell (Mel, 1999). This nonlinear property 
of distal dendrites allows individual dendritic segments to act as separate coincidence 
detectors that respond to a particular pattern of activity of nearby cells within the same 
cortical region. In the CLA, a cell's distal segments learn a set of patterns of activity of 
nearby cells within the same region (by learning to respond to sub-samples of those 
patterns), which have previously led to the subsequent activation of the cell. When such a 
pattern of local activity is later detected, the cell is put into predictive state. 
When a column is activated, representing the present activity of a particular 
pattern of feedforward inputs, then if any of the cells within that column were already in 
predictive state, only those cells transition to active state. All other cells in the column 
remain inactive. The set of active cells in the column therefore represents the current 
activity of the spatial pattern to which the entire column responds, but within the 
temporal context of prior local activity represented by the particular cell(s) that were 
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predicted to activate (ie., were in predictive state). In this way only a subset of a column's 
cells are activated when it is part of a predicted sequence, the subset representing activity 
within the temporal context of that sequence (Figure 1). If none of the cells in the column 
are in predictive state when the column is activated, then all of the cells in the column 
transition to active state. The activity of all of the cells represents the column's spatial 
pattern without preference to any particular contextual interpretation, by activating the 
cells that represent all possible interpretations. This approach is consistent with findings 
that prior expectation of a stimulus reduces neuronal activity when the stimulus occurs, 
which is the basis of the predictive coding hypothesis. 
A cell's distal dendrite segments learn these predictive associations with 
neighboring cells using a modified form of Hebbian learning. A cell c that is active at 
time t has those distal synapses that are connected with cells that were active at time t-1 
strengthened. The result is that in the future, if a pattern similar to the active pattern at 
time t-1 occurs, there will be an increased likelihood of cell c transitioning to predictive 
state. In addition, a cell c that is predictive at time t has those distal synapses that are 
connected with cells that were active at either time t or time t-1 modified. If cell c later 
transitions from predictive state to active before becoming inactive (meaning that its 
predictive state represented a prediction that in this case was true), then those synapses 
are strengthened.  Otherwise, cell c's predictive state represented an incorrect prediction, 
and so those synapses are weakened. 
It is the combination of a region's active and predictive cells that send 
feedforward signals to the next higher level in the CLA hierarchy. Depending on the 
frequency and reliability of repetition of a given sequence, a CLA region may come to 
predict some or all of the continuation of a sequence once it has received enough context 
to identify that specific sequence. Because of this, and because a CLA region outputs 
signals from both active and predictive cells, the output of a region will become more 
stable over time than its input, and particular static patterns of output will come to 
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correspond with particular sequences of input. In this way, the output of a CLA region 
has similar properties to the set of active Markov chains that was given as the output from 
a Zeta 1 node; both implementations take advantage of the principle of temporal 
slowness. However, the CLA's temporal pooler is much more flexible than Zeta 1's. It is 
compatible with CLA's sparse representations of spatial input patterns, and propagates 
the properties of sparse coding, including generalization, compositionality and efficiency 
of storage, to the representation of sequences. It is capable of continuous online learning, 
given that the learning rate is sufficiently slow, because the sparse representations at each 
level will gradually adapt as the lower level representations that they are built upon 
change. Finally, the CLA's sequence representations are sensitive to the specific order of 
the elements of a sequence, but are not bound to specific timings of sequence elements as 
were the Zeta 1 sequence representations. So long as a sequence's elements are activated 
in the correct order, the cells representing the elements of that sequence will become 
predictive and then active. This allows the CLA to respond invariantly to a given 
sequence presented at various rates of speed. 
The theory of cortical function underlying the CLA version of HTM is very 
similar to that of the Zeta 1 version. One difference is in the proposal of two different 
activity states for a pyramidal cell, active (due to feedforward excitation via proximal 
dendrites) and predictive (due to lateral excitation via distal dendrites). Another 
difference is that the CLA implementation does not yet incorporate top-down feedback 
connectivity in any way, and so it remains agnostic on the issue of the several types of 
neuron that were proposed as part of the Zeta 1 theory in order to map a neuronal 
equivalent to the feedback portion of the Bayesian belief propagation equations. 
The CLA algorithm as described learns nth-order sequences, incorporating 
variable length temporal context and making specific predictions of subsequent activity 
based on the current input combined with that context. This results in the learning of 
specific sequences, and is considered to correspond most closely with the function of 
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cortical layers 2/3. In V1, it is proposed that the response properties of cells that are 
selective to both orientation and direction of motion are learned in this way; such cells 
are found in layers 2/3 (Hirsch & Martinez, 2006). However, this system does not explain 
how the response properties of V1's complex cells may be learned, so as to be selective to 
a particular orientation with spatial invariance. Representing spatial invariance would 
require predictively activating all columns that respond to a particular orientation that are 
local to a column that is activated feedforward by input matching that orientation. This 
means ignoring prior context (direction of movement) and predicting based solely on the 
current input. One way to drop temporal context information in the CLA framework is to 
remove inhibition between the cells in a column that represent a particular input in 
various specific temporal contexts, so that when any of them are activated, they will all 
become active. It is proposed that while layers 2/3 learn specific sequences and make 
predictions based on temporal context, layer 4 learns only first order sequences, making 
predictions based only on current feedforward input. This would satisfy the requirements 
for learning spatial invariance by taking advantage of the temporal slowness principle 
(Figure 2). This effect can be obtained using the CLA algorithm by simply using a single 
cell per column. The proposal that first order sequences are learned by layer 4, while 
speculative,  is supported by the presence of complex cells in layer 4 (Martinez et al., 
2005), as well as the finding that layer 4 is thickest within sensory areas and thinner in 
association cortex, where presumably spatial invariance information has already been 
fully extracted (Hawkings et al., 2010). 
One aspect of cortical function that is not addressed by the CLA version of HTM 
is the encoding of the specific timing of sequence elements. Whereas the Zeta 1 
implementation recorded a sequence as a series of events attached to specific time steps, 
the CLA encodes the order of sequence elements but does not specify timing. This is 
useful for generalization and mirrors some aspects of biological performance. However, 
many studies have demonstrated that the brain is capable of timing discriminations at the 
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scale of hundreds of milliseconds, and that this ability is crucial for such tasks as 
coordinated movement and speech sound discrimination. Theories differ as to whether 
the source of the timing signal is centralized or distributed (Buonomano & Karmarkar, 
2002), but it is known to be represented by the time-variant activity of neuronal 
populations throughout the cortex (e.g., Jin et al., 2009; Schneider & Ghose, 2012). It is 
proposed in (Hawkins et al., 2010) that specific timing is learned by cortical layer 5, 
using the same CLA mechanism used to learn sequences in layers 2/3, but incorporating a 
timing signal (possibly received from elsewhere in the brain via layer 5's thalamic 
afferent, see (Rodriguez et al., 2005)) in order to allow layer 5 cells to become predictive 
only for the very next sequence element, and only at the time at which its activity is 
expected. Layer 5 is seen as being the most likely candidate for this role because it is the 
source of the cortex's motor output signals, as well as of feedforward output that is gated 
through the thalamus. 
The CLA version of HTM is a significant improvement over Zeta 1. Its use of 
sparse distributed representations for encoding both spatial and temporal patterns allows 
for generalization, compositionality and online learning. Its method of encoding 
sequences preserves sequence order without requiring exact timing. And its biologically 
detailed level of abstraction makes it straightforward to extend and modify to incorporate 
additional aspects of cortical function. 
The CLA is not without its own weaknesses, however. As a biologically based 
model its components don't map directly to the equations of Bayesian belief propagation, 
as those of Zeta 1 did. This means that while the CLA is capable of similar processing as 
Zeta 1 but with greater flexibility, it is also more difficult to characterize mathematically. 
The CLA currently lacks any kind of top-down feedback, which would be required for a 
complete implementation of Bayesian belief propagation (which Zeta 1 had) as well as 
for additional cortical functions such as selective attention. The current CLA 
implementation also lacks the ability to discriminate sequences based on the specific 
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timing of their elements, as discussed above. Compared with Zeta 1, the CLA has been 
utilized less outside of the company Grok (where both versions of HTM were developed; 
formerly known as Numenta), and has received little attention in academic publications 
(e.g., Price 2011; Thornton et al., 2012; Zhou & Luo, 2013). Finally, for reasons of 
processing speed and memory efficiency the CLA makes several simplifications of 
biological details that most connectionist learning models do not, such as binary cell 
activation states (as opposed to rate coding) and binary synaptic strengths controlled by 
linear weight values. These may prove to be suboptimal for some applications. 
The HTM learning model elegantly combines a number of key capabilities 
attributed to cortex, including the hierarchical dimensionality reduction of input using 
sparse distributed representation, the unsupervised learning of invariance using temporal 
slowness, and predictive coding, and its corresponding theory of cortical function maps 
well to a large set of functional and anatomical data. HTM is by no means a complete 
model of cortical function, nor is it yet fully successful in solving those problems which it 
does address. But because of its unusual set of strengths, I believe that further study, 
application, extension and refinement of the HTM CLA is warranted. To date, 
applications of HTM have focused almost entirely on pattern classification problems 
typical of posterior cortex. If the uniform structure of the cerebral cortex does point to a 
universal cortical algorithm, and if HTM (or some elaboration of it) is to be considered a 
candidate model for this fundamental cortical function, then HTM should be able to be 
applied as successfully to prefrontal and motor cortical function as it is to posterior 
cortical function. In the interest of expanding the application of HTM to a wider range of 
cortical functions, I will next review several leading models of frontal cortical function, 
and look at the degree to which a theory of cortical function with the properties of HTM 
would be compatible with these models. Through such a comparison, it may be possible 
to expose some areas where HTM is well suited to be applied to frontal cortical functions, 
and other areas where the requirements of frontal cortical functions may indicate ways in 
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which HTM may be improved. Likewise, this exercise may suggest ways in which 
models of frontal cortical function may benefit from being paired with a cortical learning 
algorithm having the properties of HTM. 
 
The Frontal Cortex 
 
The frontal lobes have long been among the least well understood regions of the 
brain. Early experiments using lesion and electrical stimulation failed to identify any 
clear functions for the majority of frontal cortex, resulting in their being considered the 
"silent lobes" for much of the twentieth century. It is only in the last several decades that 
new techniques have allowed researchers to begin to build an understanding of frontal 
lobe function. 
The frontal lobes are typically subdivided into two functionally distinct regions: 
the motor areas located at the caudal end, adjacent to the central sulcus, and the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) located at the  rostral end, behind the forehead. Ferrier (1874) first mapped 
the motor areas using direct electrical stimulation. He found that stimulation of specific 
areas of motor cortex would produce movement in corresponding muscle groups, 
resulting in a rough somatotopic map. Brief stimulation would produce muscle twitches, 
while more prolonged stimulation would produce coordinated sequences of seemingly 
meaningful movements, such as stepping or reaching. The motor areas are further 
subdivided into the primary motor area, the premotor area, and the supplementary motor 
area, based on cytoarchitectonic and cell response properties. Together, these areas make 
up the origins of the majority of axons projecting from the brain to the spinal cord via the 
cortico-spinal tract, for control of voluntary movement.  
Functions of the Prefrontal Cortex 
It is the prefrontal cortex that has only begun to yield its secrets in the last few 
decades, particularly with the use of functional imaging and single unit recording 
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methods. Functional roles that are known to depend primarily upon the prefrontal cortex 
include the representation of task, goal, strategy and reward; strategy and response 
selection and initiation; the inhibition of a prepotent response in favor of a weaker, more 
appropriate response; top-down direction of attention; active maintenance of working 
memory representations; and the storage and retrieval of explicit memories. Critical 
evidence for the association of prefrontal cortex with each of these functional roles will 
be summarized below.  
Representation of task, goal, strategy and reward. The learning of arbitrary 
conditional associations between cue and response is disrupted by PFC damage in both 
monkeys (Halsband & Passingham, 1985; Petrides, 1985) and humans (Petrides, 1990). 
Furthermore, the pattern of activation in the PFC has been shown to correspond to the 
specific task rule that is guiding behavior. Assad et al (2000) trained monkeys on a task 
that employed multiple rules but used the same cues and responses across the different 
rules. The response properties of more than half of lateral PFC neurons were found to be 
rule dependant.  
Baker et al (1996) showed that the prefrontal cortex is active in normal subjects 
when performing the Tower of London task, which requires planning several moves 
ahead. Shallice (1982) found that prefrontal patients are significantly impaired when 
performing this kind of task, making arbitrary moves that are not guided by a larger plan.  
 Level of activation in a region of orbital PFC has been found to correspond with 
the reward value of a specific stimulus (O’Doherty et al, 2000), and damage to 
ventromedial areas can lead to sociopathic behavior and difficulty making appropriate 
choices (Price, 1999). 
Strategy and response selection and initiation. Patients with prefrontal damage 
will often manifest behavior that is composed of fragmented action sequences which 
leave out relevant steps while including other, irrelevant actions. Well practiced 
behaviors are maintained, but the ability to actively guide behavior toward a purpose is 
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diminished (Duncan, 1986). Prefrontal damage also leads to behavior that is impulsive 
and lacking in regard for consequences (Luria, 1969). 
Another hallmark of prefrontal damage is the perseveration of a strategy when it 
is no longer successful. For example, prefrontal patients have increased difficulty with 
the Stroop task when the response rule changes frequently (Dunbar & Sussman, 1995; 
Cohen et al, 1999). 
Inhibition of prepotent response. The prefrontal cortex is instrumental in 
selecting responses that are appropriate not only to immediate environmental cues but 
also to latent elements of context such as goals and social norms. Patients with prefrontal 
damage will often engage in "utilization behavior" (Lhermitte, 1983), making use of 
whatever utilitarian object is present in the environment regardless of its relevance or 
appropriateness in the current context.  
In the Stroop task, subjects are required to override a stronger, more well 
practiced action selection rule that is task-irrelevant (reading) with a weaker, more 
unusual rule that is task-relevant (color naming). Patients with compromised prefrontal 
function have a specific difficulty with overriding the prepotent response rule when 
performing this task (Perrett, 1974; Vendrell et al, 1995). Similarly, patients with 
prefrontal lesions have difficulty overriding the prepotent response of saccading toward a 
stimulus, in a task in which the objective is to saccade in the opposite direction (Guitton, 
Buchtel & Douglas, 1985). Humans and animals with impaired prefrontal function have 
particular difficulty with tasks such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) and its 
analogs, which test flexible adaptation to changing task demands (Milner 1963, Dias et al 
1996, Rossi et al 1999).  
Prefrontal cortex is also implicated in verbal fluency, and prefrontal damage that 
disrupts verbal fluency as measured by a standard sentence completion task is separable 
from other loci of prefrontal damage that impair performance on a nonsense sentence 
completion task, in which the object is to complete a sentence in a way that doesn't make 
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sense. (Shallice & Burgess, 1996). Standard sentence completion can employ well-
learned response patterns, while nonsense sentence completion requires more complex 
self-organization, and inhibition of the prepotent response. 
Top-down direction of attention. PFC activity corresponds with the magnitude 
of effort required to maintain directed attention. During a task that requires attending to a 
particular stimulus dimension, prefrontal activity is increased when other stimulus 
dimensions conflict competitively with the target dimension (Banich et al. 2000).  
In a study described by Shallice and Burgess (1991), prefrontal patients with 
normal IQ scores failed to carry out simple tasks for which they were given explicit 
instructions (such as shopping for several items) because their focus was distracted by 
intervening events. 
Visual attention also suffers with impaired prefrontal function. Gaze shifts 
become haphazard, halting, and prone to repetition (Luria, 1966; Tyler, 1969). One 
region of the PFC, called the frontal eye field (FEF) due to its association with visual 
attention, is activated in a wide range of visuospatial tasks (e.g., Corbetta et al, 1993, 
1998; Fink et al, 1997; Kastner et al, 1998), and cell recording studies have shown 
activity in the FEF corresponding with both saccades (Wurtz & Mohler, 1976) and with 
covert shifts in visual attention (Kodaka et al, 1997). The FEF projects feedback 
connections to both the ventral visual cortical areas and to the parietal cortex, making it 
ideally suited for the direction of both feature based and location based visual attention 
(Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000).  
Active maintenance of working memory representations. Many studies have 
focused on the prolonged transient activity seen in prefrontal neurons during the delay 
period of a delayed-response task. In some cases the pattern of delay period activity was 
found to correlate with the specific cue dimension (such as identity, color, or location) 
that would need to be remembered during the delay period in order to successfully guide 
behavior (e.g., Fuster, 1973; Fuster, 1982). In other cases, delay period activity was found 
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to correlate with impending action (Asaad et al, 1998) or expected reward type 
(Watanabe, 1996) or magnitude (Leon & Shadlen, 1999). This maintained activity was 
also robust to interference by distracter stimuli presented during the delay period (Miller 
et al., 1996). Conversely, impaired PFC function results in increased distractibility (Chao 
& Knight, 1997). 
Storage and retrieval of memory. A variety of studies implicate the prefrontal 
cortex as having an important role in the retrieval of explicit memories (Yener & Zaffos, 
1999). The PFC is reciprocally connected with the hippocampus and closely related 
regions (Leichnetz & Astruc, 1975; Rosene & van Hoesen, 1977), and lesions to 
dorsolateral PFC typically result in impaired explicit memory retrieval (Schmaltz & 
Isaacson, 1968; Wikmark et al, 1973).  
Janowsky et al (1989) conducted explicit memory tests of patients with prefrontal 
lesions and found that they were impaired in free recall, which depends on self-
organization and retrieval strategies, despite good performance in recognition. Gershberg 
and Shimamura (1995) found that frontal patients were impaired in the use of strategies 
during both the encoding and free recall of explicit memories, resulting in compromised 
performance. Schacter (1997) found increased prefrontal blood flow associated with 
retrieval of episodic memories. 
Functional Specializations of Frontal Regions 
The frontal cortex is composed of a number of areas that can be differentiated by 
their cytoarchitecture and connectivity. There is also a growing body of knowledge about 
how these areas differ functionally. 
The most basic distinction among frontal areas is between the motor areas and the 
prefrontal cortex. The motor areas consist of primary motor cortex (Brodmann area 4) 
and the premotor and supplementary motor areas (Brodmann area 6). These areas are 
agranular (lacking in a well defined layer 4) and typically produce muscle movement 
when electrically stimulated. Adjacent to and connected with the premotor area is the 
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dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann areas 8, 9 and 46) and the ventrolateral PFC 
(Brodmann areas 44, 45 and part of 47). At the anterior pole of the brain is the orbital 
frontal cortex (Brodmann areas 10, 11, and part of 47). The prefrontal areas are granular 
(or dysgranular in the case of dorsolateral area 8, which is transitional between the 
granular PFC and the agranular premotor area), and do not typically produce muscle 
movement when electrically stimulated. 
The lateral areas of the prefrontal cortex have been implicated in the learning of 
stimulus-response rules, and in the inhibition of well-learned rules in favor of weakly-
learned rules that are more task appropriate given the current context (Diamond & 
Goldman-Rakic, 1989). Lesions to the lateral areas compromise both of these functions 
(e.g., Milner, 1963; Bussey et al, 2002). Sustained activity in seen in the lateral PFC 
during a delay task; this activity typically corresponds with a cue stimulus that is being 
remembered in order to guide response after the delay, with the specific rule being 
employed to guide a response, or with a specific action being planned (Constantinidis et 
al, 2001; Assad et al, 2000; D'Esposito et al, 2000). The lateral PFC is reciprocally 
connected with higher level sensory areas in posterior cortex, as well as with premotor 
cortex, and so it is well placed to build representations that connect perception with 
action (Fuster, 1997).  
As a stimulus-response rule becomes well learned, however, the role of the lateral 
PFC in support of that rule decreases. Well learned rules are robust to lateral PFC lesions, 
and Wallis and Miller (2003) showed that premotor cortex response distinguishes 
between well-learned rules more than 100ms earlier than does lateral PFC response. This 
indicates that as a rule is trained extensively, it is learned directly by premotor cortex and 
no longer requires the support of lateral PFC in order to produce behavior that is guided 
by that rule (Bunge, 2004).  
The medial prefrontal cortex likewise receives sensory information from posterior 
areas, but unlike the lateral PFC it is also connected with brain centers primarily involved 
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in emotion and motivation, such as the amygdala and the cingulate cortex. The medial 
PFC contributes to conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al, 2001), decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008), outcome evaluation (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002), social interaction (Amodio & Frith, 2006), and the processing of 
emotion (Etkin et al., 2006). While lateral PFC specializes in the execution of cognitive 
and behavioral actions, medial PFC specializes in emotion, motivation and decision 
making. 
The most posterior area of medial PFC (adjacent to the premotor area) is 
concerned with the selection of individual behaviors, activating strongly when there is 
conflict between competing responses. Further anterior to this is an area of medial PFC 
that is concerned with decision making, with activity corresponding to the relative 
desirability of multiple decision options. Further anterior still is an area that is sensitive to 
strategy, which activates preferentially in response to deviation from the subject's chosen 
decision making strategy (Venkatraman et al, 2009). A similar pattern of activity ranging 
from concrete to abstract representations was found in lateral PFC by Christoff et al 
(2009). These results indicate a hierarchical organization of control in the frontal cortex, 
from the level of concrete movements in the motor and premotor areas, through specific 
behaviors in posterior PFC, to more abstract concepts and strategies in anterior PFC. 
The posterior cortex is frequently characterized as having two distinct processing 
streams. The dorsal or 'how' stream (involving the occipital and parietal lobes) is 
concerned with properties of the physical environment that are relevant to the guidance of 
action, while the ventral or 'what' stream (involving the occipital and temporal lobes) is 
concerned with the identification of objects in the environment. There is evidence that 
this system of organization extends to the frontal lobe as well. Anatomically, ventral PFC 
is connected primarily with ventral areas of posterior cortex, and dorsal PFC is likewise 
mainly connected with dorsal posterior cortex. While activity in much of the PFC shows 
correspondence with a mix of stimulus ('what') and response ('how') information, ventral 
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and dorsal PFC do appear to have some specialization for 'what' and 'how' processing, 
respectively; Nagel et al (2008) found that manipulations of a task's response selection 
difficulty would modulate activity in dorsolateral PFC, while manipulation of semantic 
selection difficulty would modulate activity in the ventrolateral PFC.  
In summary, there is evidence for functional specialization in the prefrontal cortex 
along three axes: medial areas are concerned with 'hot' value and emotion based 
processing while lateral areas are involved in 'cold' cognitive and motor processing; 
posterior areas are concerned with concrete actions while anterior areas process abstract 
concepts and strategies; and ventral areas are part of the brain's 'what' object identity 
stream while dorsal areas are more concerned with the 'how' of action guidance (O'Reilly, 
2010). 
Models of Frontal Cortical Function 
So far I have reviewed a variety of functions attributed to frontal cortex, as well as 
some patterns that underlie the localization of these functions. The distinguishing 
functions of frontal cortex, including working memory, attentional set, and the 
representation and selection of actions and strategies, would appear to have little in 
common with the characteristics of posterior cortex as understood through a model such 
as HTM — the representation of sensory input with increasing complexity, temporal 
extension, and invariance at each successive hierarchical level. As a first step toward 
reconciling these differences, it would be useful to review a number of different models 
that propose specific mechanisms underlying frontal cortical function. Most of these 
models are driven by a particular subset of frontal phenomena, but taken together they 
begin to build a coherent picture that is compatible with both biological and cognitive 
constraints. 
Baddeley's working memory model. Building upon Atkinson and Shiffrin’s 
(1968) multi-store model, Baddeley introduced an influential model of executive function 
based on multiple working memory stores (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986). 
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Motivated by experiments showing that subjects could perform two working memory 
tasks simultaneously without degraded performance only if they did not share the same 
perceptual domain, Baddeley's model consists of two domain-specific memory store 
"slave" systems, the phonological loop for written and spoken language and the visuo-
spatial sketch pad for visual information and navigation, as well as a central executive to 
control these components. A later update of the model (Baddeley, 2000) added a fourth 
subsystem, an episodic memory buffer, to help explain the interactions between the 
central executive, working memory, and long term memory.  
Innovations provided by Baddeley's model included the separation of the 
previously unitary concept of short term memory into multiple modality-specific memory 
stores, as well as emphasizing the active, "working" aspect of short term memory, as 
embodied by the central executive. The central executive is seen as being in charge of 
attention, action and cognition, of selecting what is stored in short term memory, and of 
controlling interactions with long term memory. It is presented as a unitary concept, and 
Baddeley develops no theory for how it carries out its functions.    
Attentional control. Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986; Shallice, 1982; Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991, 1996) proposed a model of executive function that is rooted in the concept 
of a production system (e.g. Newell, 1973; Anderson, 1983). A schema, consisting of a 
sequence of cognitive or behavioral actions, is activated when a particular trigger pattern 
is detected. Such a trigger pattern may be made up of perceptual inputs as well as the 
output states of previously activated schemas. If multiple connected schemas are 
triggered to be active simultaneously, mutual inhibition prevents all but the most strongly 
activated schema from being initiated. The more frequently that a schema's trigger leads 
to the activation of that schema, the more well-learned it becomes, and the more strongly 
it will inhibit connected schemas. This system, called the contention scheduler, is 
considered sufficient to handle routine responses and cognitive processes.  
40 
For novel or non-routine processes a slower, more flexible system is employed, 
called the supervisory attentional system (SAS). This system is employed when existing 
schemas are not sufficient to address the current situation, and it utilizes general, abstract 
patterns to generate new schemas specific to the situation. The SAS guides the activity of 
the contention scheduler, when necessary, by providing biasing signals that alter the 
probabilities of activation for the various schemas. 
The SAS is considered to be located in the prefrontal cortex, and is responsible 
for the functions attributed to PFC such as top-down selective attention, the integration of 
action and perception over time, working memory, episodic memory retrieval, error 
monitoring, and the inhibition of automatic responses in favor of more contextually 
appropriate responses. The functions of the contention scheduler map to those functions 
considered to be carried out by the frontal cortex (particularly its posterior areas) in 
cooperation with posterior cortex. 
Beyond simply attaching new labels to groups of brain functions, the Norman & 
Shallice model places focus on the kinds of representations that would need to exist in 
order for the prefrontal cortex to carry out its work, the process of generating those 
representations, and the conditions under which the deliberate, supervisory functions of 
the PFC would be set in motion. Other contributions of this model include the emphasis 
on a separation between fast, routine, automatic processes and slow, deliberate and 
flexible processes, and the proposal that the SAS mainly influences the contention 
scheduler by biasing particular schemas to be more or less likely to activate. 
Temporal integration. Fuster (1980/1997, 1999) views the frontal cortex as a 
motor/executive hierarchy with the purpose of ordering sequences of action toward goals. 
The motor area represents and controls individual movements; premotor representations 
introduce more abstract properties such as trajectory, and can be agent-invariant as in the 
case of mirror neurons that fire both when a particular action is executed or is only 
perceived being performed; prefrontal cortex integrates perception and action to control 
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novel behavior, with representations increasing in complexity and abstraction toward the 
anterior pole. 
Fuster focuses on both the processes carried out by the PFC as well as the 
representations involved. In his framework, PFC representations are schemas, or 
temporal gestalts, combining elements that may be very abstract – in some cases defined 
only by their relationships with one another. These schemas are formed by repeated 
practice or reenactment of similar actions and situations, such that networks form 
representing the common elements of these sequences. These networks may then act as 
action symbols, in the same way that invariant representations in high level posterior 
cortex act as perceptual symbols. Further abstraction at higher levels may lead to general 
concepts of action, such as responsibility, altruism, or rule of law.  
In Fuster's view, the successful temporal integration of action and perception over 
time, which forms the foundation for cognition, behavior, and language, is based on the 
capacity to mediate cross-temporal contingencies, such as "If now this, then later that; if 
earlier that, then now this". This in turn relies primarily on 3 subfunctions of prefrontal 
cortex: short-term motor memory or preparatory set, short-term perceptual memory for 
retaining sensory information upon which future action will be based, and inhibitory 
control of interference. 
As with Norman & Shallice's production system based model, Fuster believes that 
the execution of a behavior is triggered and maintained by the recognition of a particular 
pattern of inputs, both from the environment and from internal representations. The result 
is a feedback loop, with perception influencing behavior, and behavior affecting the 
environment, which then modifies perception. 
Goldman-Rakic' working memory model. The model proposed by Goldman-
Rakic et al (1987, 1996) is built on her pioneering work studying the active maintenance 
of frontal lobe representations during delay tasks. While other contemporary models 
proposed that prefrontal functions such as attention, affect, inhibitory control, motor 
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planning and spatial working memory are mapped to different cytoarchitectonic regions 
of PFC (e.g., Fuster, 1980; Pribram, 1987), Goldman-Rakic contended that working 
memory is a common process shared by the various areas of PFC. Rather than different 
functions being mapped to different PFC areas, each PFC area works with different 
domains of information, and applies the common process of working memory to each of 
them. 
For example, electrode recording studies in monkeys and human functional 
imaging experiments show that certain more dorsal PFC areas are active when the subject 
remembers spatial location information during a delay, while specific ventral PFC areas 
are active when the subject remembers object and feature information. These two areas 
are connected to posterior cortical regions appropriate to the domains of information that 
they handle (parietal and inferotemporal cortex, respectively).  
Within a particular area of PFC, Goldman-Rakic proposes that the activity of cells 
within a single cortical column codes for specific content (for example, a specific 
location, object, color, or visual feature). Different cells within such a column may 
respond under different conditions, however; some may respond when a stimulus is 
registered, others while the representation is being actively maintained during a delay 
period, and still others correspond with response preparedness. Goldman-Rakic stresses 
that these three categories of sensory, memorial and motor subfunctions are represented 
within  the same microarchitectural cortical module, rather than being compartmentalized 
into separate PFC regions. 
The executive functions of the PFC had previously been considered to be 
governed by a polymodal and general purpose mechanism in charge of control and 
selection processes, for example Baddeley's (1974) 'central executive' or Norman & 
Shallice's (1980) 'supervisory attentional system'. Goldman-Rakic's model took a first 
step toward decomposing this "homunculus"-like executive system by proposing that 
executive processing is the result of interactions between multiple parallel, independent, 
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domain-specific processing modules that each incorporate sensory, working memory, and 
motor control functions, and that each utilize connections with domain-appropriate 
posterior, premotor and limbic brain regions. 
Another important contribution of the Goldman-Rakic model was to propose that 
the prefrontal function of inhibiting prepotent responses in favor of more context 
appropriate responses, which when compromised results in perseveration and 
distractibility, does not reflect an independent and localizable 'inhibitory' function of the 
PFC. Instead, prefrontal working memory provides the activation bias necessary to select 
a weaker correct response over a prepotent incorrect response; disturbance of this 
working memory function removes that bias, allowing the default, prepotent response to 
be activated instead of the correct response.  
Structured event complex framework. Most models of PFC function focus on 
the range of algorithms or processes that are mediated by the PFC, such as attention, 
working memory, conflict detection, etc. These processes are often discussed 
independently from the content upon which they act, which is considered to be stored in 
posterior and/or motor cortex. Grafman (2002; Forbes & Grafman, 2010) chooses instead 
to take a representational approach, viewing the PFC primarily as an organ of long term 
memory storage, and focusing on the structure and properties of the types of 
representations that are used by the PFC. This representational approach parallels the way 
in which posterior cortical functions, such as object, face or word recognition, are usually 
analyzed (Wood & Grafman, 2003).  
Grafman's framework is based on the structured event complex (SEC), an ordered 
series of linked semantic representations of events. SECs have an onset, which is 
generally primed or activated by an environmental stimulus, as well as an offset, which 
corresponds to a behavioral goal or end state. The individual events that make up an SEC 
may be semantically independent, but an SEC is encoded and retrieved as a linked 
episode, and may be "run" as a simulation (cf. Barsalou et al, 2003).    
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SECs lend semantic and temporal structure to goal-directed actions and 
predictions, allowing an agent to project how various scenarios will unfold and make 
decisions on that basis. They may also be divided and combined in unique ways to allow 
for an increasing complexity of behaviors and predictions.   
In Grafmans's view, SECs are employed throughout the PFC, with different areas 
specializing in SEC representations of different domains. In this way, posterior PFC 
SECs may represent simple, well learned action sequences while anterior areas deal with 
more complex SECs such as long term goals; medial PFC may utilize SECs that are 
predictive of behavioral goals while lateral SECs are composed of abstractions that may 
be adapted to a variety of  applications, and so on. 
Guided Activation. Miller and Cohen (2001) proposed an influential model that 
sought to integrate a wide range of data and a variety of previous frameworks of 
prefrontal function. In their view, the basic role of the PFC is to bias activation in other 
cortical areas toward behaviorally relevant goals. It accomplishes this by maintaining 
activity that is representative of the goals, rules and attentional templates involved in 
accomplishing a task. This activity provides context that guides the flow of activity 
elsewhere in the cortex along pathways that lead toward the accomplishment of those 
goals by establishing the appropriate mappings between inputs, internal states and 
outputs. Through repeated practice of a task, other brain structures such as premotor 
cortex learn these mappings, and so the need for prefrontal control diminishes; PFC 
activity is therefore only necessary when learning novel tasks. 
The Stroop task provides a simple example of this. The correct response in this 
task is to name the color that a color name word is printed in; the prepotent, well-learned 
response, however, is to read the color name word itself. According to the guided 
activation model, prefrontal activity may bias activation toward the visual color feature 
representations in posterior cortex, and therefore provide those representations with 
greater influence over response activation, enabling the color naming response to 
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outcompete the prepotent word reading response. The PFC provides top-down biases 
upon sensory representations, response execution, episodic memory retrieval, emotional 
valuation, etc., which may favor weaker, task-relevant responses or interpretations over 
others that are stronger, but task-irrelevant. This is especially important when task 
demands run counter to well learned responses, as in the Stroop task, and when they 
change rapidly, as in the WCST (and of course in many real life situations).  
From the perspective of this model, active maintenance of representations is the 
primary distinguishing feature of prefrontal cortex. It is the underlying mechanism behind 
attentional set, working memory, and the inhibition of inappropriate responses, and 
allows for the integration of perceptions, actions, and consequences over time. This raises 
several questions. How is PFC activity maintained? How is a new representation 'gated' 
in, to begin being actively maintained? Does active maintenance of a representation end 
by gradual decay, or by being explicitly shut off or replaced? How does the prefrontal 
cortex determine from moment to moment what information should be gated in and 
maintained, and what information should not? How is more than one representation 
actively maintained at one time, and how may these multiple representations be updated 
independently of one another? 
Miller and Cohen begin to address some of these questions. Several possible 
methods are presented by which the PFC could maintain the activity of a representation 
over time: cellular models assume that prefrontal neurons have an intrinsic mechanism 
for maintaining activity, while circuit models propose recurrent connectivity through 
closed loop attractor networks. Such loops may be fully contained within the PFC, or 
they may involve subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia and thalamus.  
Based on previous research (Cohen et al, 1996; Braver & Cohen, 2000), the 
authors proposed that the midbrain dopaminergic (DA) system plays an important role in 
the updating or 'gating in' of new representations to be actively maintained. The level of 
activity of DA neurons appears to act as a reinforcement learning signal in the prefrontal 
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cortex (Schultz et al, 1993; Schultz et al, 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al, 2000); DA 
neurons normally fire tonically, but produce a burst of activity when an unexpected 
predictor of reward occurs, or a temporary decrease in activity when an unexpected 
predictor of punishment (or an absense of expected reward) occurs. These signals initially 
accompany unexpected primary reward or punishment (such as feeding or pain), but 
through a learning process the signals 'migrate' backward in time to the initial cue that 
predicts the primary reinforcer (such as a sound or the presence of an object, which is 
predictably followed by the primary reinforcer). The moment that an unexpected reward 
predictor occurs is just when it would be most useful to gate that stimulus representation 
into active maintenance, so that it can bias attention and behavior in the direction of 
pursuing the predicted reward. Miller and Cohen suggest that the DA burst itself may act 
as the trigger to gate current input into active maintenance, by modulating the influence 
of afferent connections to the PFC.  
The notion that the DA burst provides the PFC with a signal both for gating and 
for learning raises the possibility that it also allows the system to learn when to gate. 
Initial, exploratory, DA-triggered gating would sometimes produce behavior that leads to 
reward, and this would result in reinforcement of the association between the current 
context of cortical activity and the DA gating signal. This effect would increase the 
probability that a similar context in the future would again lead to gating, and then to 
rewarding behavior, further strengthening the association, and so on. This bootstrapping 
mechanism would allow the prefrontal cortex to learn on its own to adaptively control the 
gating of active maintenance. Such a self organizing control principle for the primary 
function of prefrontal cortex goes a long way toward closing the theoretical gap of the 
"central executive," and eliminating any need to invoke a mysterious "homonculus" at the 
top of the hierarchy of control. 
While leaving many questions still to be answered, the guided activation model 
succeeds in integrating a large body of neurophysiological and neuropsychological data, 
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and providing an elegant explanation for the many prefrontal functions addressed by 
earlier models. One important area to which this model has little new to add, however, is 
the study of prefrontal representations. The model is compatible with earlier views of 
PFC representations such as Norman and Shallice's schemas and Grafman's SECs, as 
discussed above. Miller and Cohen consider the PFC, like the rest of cortex, as being 
specialized for extracting the regularities across individual episodes, and generating 
abstract representations that may be applied in many different situations. Like Fuster, 
Grafman, and others, they acknowledge that PFC and motor representations require a 
method to enforce the correct sequencing of cognitive and motor actions. But the 
specifics of how abstract and time-spanning representations are generated by prefrontal 
cortex is not addressed by this model.  
Comparing Frontal and Posterior Cortex 
According to the guided activation model, and consistent with the other major 
frameworks reviewed above, one key function that sets frontal cortex apart from posterior 
cortex is the active maintenance of representations. This is carried out in such a way that 
it meets the seemingly contradictory goals of being robust to distraction, while also 
allowing representations to be dynamically gated into active maintenance as needed. A 
second important function of frontal cortex is the top-down gating of action selection 
through the executive hierarchy, from prefrontal through premotor and finally to motor 
cortex, so as to activate only the most appropriate task representation, preparatory set and 
specific action at the correct time.  
There are, then, at least two important functions performed by frontal cortex that 
have no clear analogue in posterior cortex, both of which involve the gating of influence 
from one cortical area to another. Starting from a default assumption that there is a 
common cortical algorithm carried out by all areas of cortex, it would follow that there 
must be some variation or extension of this algorithm that would explain the functions 
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specific to frontal cortex. In order to understand these functional differences, it would be 
useful to compare the structure and connectivity of frontal and posterior cortex. 
The cytoarchitecture of prefrontal cortex is considered homotypical isocortex 
(Mesulam, 1997), having a structure very similar to that of posterior association areas. In 
areas of PFC that approach the bordering limbic regions, there is a gradual transition 
toward paralimbic features such as a thinner layer 4 and a decrease in the size of 
pyramidal cells in layers 3 and 5 (Barbas & Pandya, 1989). The motor cortex (area 4) is 
the only idiotypical area in the frontal lobe; it is missing a well developed granular layer 
(layer 4). Outside of these exceptions, the majority of frontal cortex is fairly homogenous 
in cytoarchitecture, and very similar to posterior areas that do not receive primary sensory 
afferent (Kaufer & Lewis, 1999). Given its largely uniform structure, functional 
specializations of the prefrontal areas are more likely to result from differences in 
connectivity rather than cytoarchitectural characteristics (Fuster, 1997).  
As with posterior cortex, neurons in frontal cortex are organized in closely 
interconnected minicolumns that run perpendicular to the surface of the cortex. Neurons 
making up one minicolumn tend to be isoresponsive, tuned to fire in response to the same 
stimulus – for example, the same spatial location, visual feature or direction of movement 
– though the response timing relative to stimulus onset may vary between neurons within 
a minicolumn (Kritzer & Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Rao et al, 1999).  
Frontal cortex also contains larger functional groupings, similar to the 
hypercolumns seen in posterior sensory areas. In frontal cortex these larger groupings are 
arranged in the form of elongated bands or stripes (Levitt et al, 1993). Some neurons 
located in frontal layer 2/3 project axon collaterals horizontally. These projections 
terminate in fields with the appearance of stripes, interleaved with gaps of similar size 
and shape. Cells within a single stripe or within a small number of nearby stripes may be 
interconnected in this way. These connections are reciprocal, and are formed between 
excitatory pyramidal cells. This recirculating arrangement within a group of stripes 
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provides a possible anatomical substrate for the kind of reverberatory attractor network 
that would be useful for maintaining activity of a prefrontal representation. A possible 
complementary system of intrinsic maintenance of prefrontal activity is the property of 
bistability that has been found in prefrontal neurons, whereby a cell may be temporarily 
"switched" into a state that raises or lowers its threshold for activation (Frank et al, 2001). 
The NMDA receptors that may allow a prefrontal neuron to be switched into an "on" 
state, temporarily biased toward activation, are sensitive to the timing of incoming spikes 
(Wang, 1999). This raises the possibility that the temporal characteristics of afferent 
activity may determine whether or not that activity is "gated in" to influence active 
maintenance in the receiving stripe of prefrontal cortex. An actively maintained 
representation may remain stable under normal conditions of afferent activity, but may be 
replaced by a new pattern when subject to bursting afferent activity (O'Reilly, Munakata 
et al, 2012; Hazy et al, in preparation, as cited in O'Reilly, Hazy et al, 2012). This 
property will act as an important foundation for the models reviewed below. 
Corticocortical connections in posterior sensory cortex are arranged in a clearly 
hierarchical manner. At each step in a sensory hierarchy, layer 2/3 cells project axons that 
connect with layer 4 cells at the next higher level of the hierarchy. Layer 5 cells, on the 
other hand, project back to the next lower level in the hierarchy, where their axons 
terminate in layer 1. Each step in such a hierarchy is reciprocally connected in this way. 
Frontal cortex is arranged similarly (Fuster, 1997). Primary motor cortex is at the bottom 
of the executive hierarchy. Here, layer 5 cells project axons top-down to the cranial 
nerves and the corticospinal tract, where they directly control voluntary movement. Being 
at the base of the motor hierarchy, primary motor cortex receives no bottom-up afferent 
and has no distinct layer 4. Primary motor cortex does project bottom-up from its layer 
2/3 to layer 4 in premotor cortex, which reciprocally projects top-down from layer 5 to 
layer 1 in motor cortex. Likewise, premotor cortex projects bottom-up from layer 2/3 to 
layer 4 in adjacent areas of prefrontal cortex, which in turn project top-down to layer 1 in 
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premotor cortex. However, this clear frontal lobe hierarchy ends once it reaches the 
prefrontal cortex; different areas of prefrontal cortex are not interconnected in a clearly 
hierarchical manner. The roles of individual layers remain the same in PFC – for 
example, layer 4 remains primarily a recipient of projections from other areas, and layers 
2/3 and 5 project axons to other areas. But for two given nearby areas of PFC, the layer 4 
of each area may receive afferent from the other area, and the layers 2/3 and 5 of each 
area may project to the other area (Barbas, 2006). The result is a highly interconnected, 
and sometimes circular, arrangement of pathways within prefrontal cortex. 
Besides the hierarchically arranged connections between frontal regions and the 
heterarchical connections within the PFC, frontal cortex also has reciprocal cortico-
cortical connectivity with posterior cortex. At each level of the posterior sensory 
hierarchies, bottom-up projections are sent both to the next higher level in the sensory 
stream, as well as to a specific area of frontal cortex (Fuster, 1997). For example, primary 
somatosensory cortex projects not only to secondary somatosensory cortex but also to 
primary motor cortex. Secondary somatosensory cortex (area 5) projects both to tertiary 
somatosensory cortex (area 7) as well as to premotor cortex. Area 7 projects to sensory 
convergence zones in the temporal lobe, as well as to dorsolateral prefrontal areas 45 and 
46. Each of these connections are reciprocal. This arrangement results in multi-tiered 
connections between the posterior sensory hierarchy and the frontal executive hierarchy. 
Such nested feedback loops may facilitate the gradual migration of stimulus-response 
learning from prefrontal deliberate control to premotor automation, and may allow 
attentional set to be controlled at various points along the axis of specificity vs. 
abstraction. 
In addition to cortico-cortical connections, the prefrontal cortex has many 
connections with subcortical structures, both directly and via the thalamus. The PFC has 
direct reciprocal connections with the brainstem, hypothalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, 
and paralymbic structures such as the cingulate cortex. The orbitofrontal PFC has 
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extensive connections with the amygdala, in support of its "hot" emotion- and 
motivation-based processing, while the dorsal PFC, having a role in the encoding and 
retrieval of episodic memory, is directly connected with the hippocampus and 
parahippocampal cortex (Nauta, 1964; Fuster, 1997). 
The PFC also receives its most prominent subcortical projections from the 
thalamus. While several thalamic nuclei project to the PFC, the majority of thalamic 
afferent is received from the mediodorsal nucleus (MD); in fact, one of the most widely 
used delineations of prefrontal cortex, both in application to humans and across species, 
is that area of cortex which receives afferent from mediodorsal thalamus (Fuster, 1997). 
The nucleus is made up of two components that vary in cytoarchitecture: the medial 
component is called magnocellular, due to the large size of its cells, while the lateral 
component with its smaller cells is called parvocellular. Prefrontal afferent channeled 
through the magnocellular component originates mainly from areas of the temporal lobe 
including  the amygdala, prepiriform cortex and inferior temporal cortex. Afferents 
channeled through the parvocellular component, on the other hand, originate from the 
prefrontal cortex itself. Two other thalamic nuclei, the ventral anterior nucleus (VA) and 
the ventral lateral nucleus (VL) are connected in a similar fashion with premotor and 
motor areas of the frontal lobe. These thalamic nuclei, which receive topologically 
organized excitatory projections from areas of frontal cortex and return excitatory 
projections to nearby areas of frontal cortex, comprise a potential candidate for the type 
of gating system that would be required by the models discussed above. If these thalamic 
relays could be opened or closed with behaviorally appropriate timing, the resulting 
mechanism could allow a representation active in prefrontal areas to be selectively gated 
into clusters of recurrently connected stripes, influencing and modifying the continuously  
maintained activity within those stripes by replacing it with a new representation. 
Likewise, such a gating mechanism could be used to selectively determine when the 
activity of one area of frontal cortex would be allowed to influence the activity of a 
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second area, so as, for example, to allow the representation of a motor plan in premotor 
cortex to influence activity lower in the motor hierarchy, thereby initiating the execution 
of a planned behavior. In fact, there is increasing evidence that these thalamic relays may 
be used as a gating mechanism in those ways. 
If such topologically mapped reciprocal connections between frontal cortex and 
thalamus do function as a gating mechanism, then the question remains as to how these 
gates would be controlled so as to execute behaviorally adaptive cognitive and motor 
actions. The answer may lie with a group of related subcortical structures called the basal 
ganglia (Redgrave et al, 1999; Frank et al, 2001; Sherman & Guillery, 2001). Nearly all 
areas of cortex project to the basal ganglia, by sending collateral axons from layer 5 
pyramidal cells to either the caudate nucleus or the putamen (together called the 
striatum), which act as the input nuclei of the basal ganglia (Swanson, 2000). Unlike 
most cortical efferents, projections to the striatum are not reciprocated; the basal ganglia 
do not project back to cortex directly. Instead, the basal ganglia project inhibitory efferent 
to the very thalamic nuclei that mediate reciprocating loops from frontal cortical areas 
and back again (MD, VA and VL), as described above. Normally the basal ganglia send a 
tonic inhibitory signal to these thalamic nuclei, but by pausing this inhibitory influence or 
by increasing its intensity, the basal ganglia is able to modulate the degree to which 
cortical input is "passed through" and relayed back to cortex (Chevalier & Deniau, 1995). 
In this way, the basal ganglia system is in a position to control the thalamic gating 
mechanism of the frontal cortex. 
This basal ganglia control mechanism is not a single, unified circuit; instead, it is 
comprised of at least five distinct cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical loops that operate in 
parallel (Alexander et al, 1986). In the case of each of these loops, a discrete area of the 
striatum receives topologically mapped afferent from a particular area of frontal cortex, 
as well as from several functionally related areas of frontal or posterior cortex. This area 
of the striatum then sends inhibitory projections to specific areas of the globus pallidus, 
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which in turn send inhibitory efferent to the area of thalamus responsible for relaying 
information to the particular area of frontal cortex that makes up the primary input for 
this particular loop (Figure 3).  
The most well researched of these control loops is the motor circuit. The 
supplementary motor area, which is known to play an important role in the programming 
and initiation of movements, projects efferent from its layer 5 pyramidal cells to the 
putamen (a section of the striatum). Other cortical areas that represent information 
relevant to motor control, including the arcuate premotor area, motor cortex, and parietal 
somatosensory areas, also project to the same region of the striatum. The putamen 
projects to the globus pallidus, which in turn sends inhibitory projections to the ventral 
lateral nucleus of the thalamus, which relays motor information to the primary and 
supplementary motor areas (Alexander et al, 1986; Strick, 1976). In this way, the basal 
ganglia is able to utilize information from motor and somatosensory areas to inform the 
control of the thalamic nucleus that gates motor information into motor and 
supplementary motor cortex.  
In addition to the motor circuit, an oculomotor circuit has been identified which 
receives information from the frontal eye field, the dorsolateral PFC and the posterior 
parietal cortex, and controls the thalamic nucleus (the superior colliculus) that relays back 
to the frontal eye field; a prefrontal circuit which receives information from the 
dorsolateral PFC, posterior parietal, and promotor areas, and controls the thalamic relay 
back to the dorsolateral PFC; an orbitofrontal circuit which receives information from the 
orbitofrontal cortex, temporal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and which 
controls the thalamic relay back to orbitofrontal cortex; and an anterior cingulate circuit 
that receives information from the ACC, hippocampus and entorhinal cortex and controls 
the relay of information back to the ACC. Somatotopic arrangement is maintained 
through all stages of these circuits; for example, areas of somatosensory, premotor and 
motor cortex that map to the left hand all project to the same section of striatum. This 
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section of striatum, via further connections within the basal ganglia, projects to the area 
of VL that relays information to motor areas mapping to the left hand. The spatial 
resolution of this gating control mechanism remains unknown; while there are at least 
five distinct circuits, it's possible that independent gating actions may be performed at a 
much finer scale, possibly gating thalamic input to individual clusters of stripes. 
In summary, the primary functional differences between frontal and posterior 
cortex can be viewed as comprising a frontal mechanism of recurrent connections and 
bistability that supports the active maintenance of representations, and a system of 
thalamic relays that allow a flow of information to be dynamically gated into active 
maintenance, as well as from one area of frontal cortex to another. The basal ganglia 
adaptively controls this gating system, learning how to respond to the diverse cortical 
afferents that it receives by opening and closing thalamic relays at behaviorally 
appropriate times. How the basal ganglia make use of the brain's DA system to control 
the gating process that underlies cognitive and motor executive function is one of the 
issues addressed by the neural models reviewed below.  
Neural Models of Frontal Cortical Function 
Based on the ideas described above, a neural model was proposed by Frank et al 
(2001) and further extended (O'Reilly & Frank, 2006) as a computational model, the 
prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia working memory model (PBWM). These models 
elaborate and simulate several neural systems underlying frontal cortical function, and 
have been successfully employed in exploring both normal and impaired frontal function 
by comparing performance and network dynamics on frontal tasks between the model 
and human subjects (e.g., Frank et al, 2004; Frank & O'Reilly, 2006; Frank et al, 2007; 
Moustafa et al, 2008; Frank & Badre, 2012). 
A summary of the proposed neural model is as follows. The striatum, as described 
above, receives input from a wide range of cortical areas; different sections of the 
striatum receive input from different groups of functionally related cortical areas, 
55 
depending upon which thalamic relay that section of the striatum is involved in 
controlling. The striatum itself is composed of an interleaved mix of two different types 
of cell clusters, called patch (or striosomes) and matrix (or matrisomes). Striosomes are 
involved in controlling the brain's DA system, and will be discussed further below. 
Matrisomes contain two types of spiny neuron, referred to as "Go" and "NoGo" for their 
functional roles in the gating system. Go neurons send inhibitory projections to the 
internal segment of the globus pallidus (GPi), which in turn sends inhibitory projections 
to the corresponding thalamic relay area. Therefore, when the striatal Go cells are 
activated, they inhibit the connected GPi cells (which are normally tonically active) and 
so remove inhibition from the corresponding thalamic relay cells. This allows those 
thalamic relay cells to activate based on the cortical input that they receive, and so opens 
the thalamic "gate" that those cells represent functionally. This series of two inhibitory 
steps that results in the opening of a thalamic gate, the direct "Go" pathway, is 
complemented by an overlapping series of three inhibitory steps that result in the closing 
of a gate. In this indirect "NoGo" pathway, the NoGo matrisome neurons send inhibitory 
projections to the external segment of the globus pallidus (GPe), which itself normally 
sends a tonic inhibitory signal to the corresponding Go pathway section of the GPi. 
Therefore, when the striatal NoGo cells are activated, they quiet the tonic activity of the 
corresponding GPe cells, which thus stop sending an inhibitory signal to the 
corresponding GPi cells. The GPi cells are then free to increase the strength of the tonic 
inhibitory signal that they send to the corresponding thalamic relay cells, preventing 
activation of those cells and so closing the thalamocortical gate that they represent. 
This system of opposed Go and NoGo pathways places the locus of control for 
frontal thalamic relays with the striatal matrix cells. The activity of striatal matrix Go 
cells will bias the corresponding thalamic gate toward opening, while the activity of 
striatal matrix NoGo cells will bias the corresponding gate toward closing. What remains 
is the question of how these striatal matrix cells are themselves controlled. As discussed 
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above, the midbrain DA signal that responds with increased firing to the unexpected 
presence of a positive reinforcer would be a good fit for the requirements of a working 
memory gating signal; it is just those stimuli that result in the unexpected prospect of 
reward that should be maintained in memory so as to bias behavior toward the pursuit of 
that reward. In addition, it would be useful for the gating mechanism to learn what 
contexts of cortical activity, when followed by the opening or closing of a 
thalamocortical gate,  result in unexpected reward – so that gating regimens can be 
learned and can continue to be followed even once the rewards involved are no longer 
unexpected, and thus the DA system is no longer engaged. 
The striatal matrix cells are well equipped to fulfill both of these requirements. 
The substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), another component of the basal ganglia, 
continuously releases DA into the striatum, at a level that varies with the unexpected 
presence or absence of reinforcers. Striatal matrix cells incorporate two different types of 
DA receptors: Go cells have D1 receptors, making them more likely to fire in response to 
cortical afferent in the presence of DA, while NoGo cells have D2 receptors, making 
them less likely to fire in the presence of DA. Thus, the higher DA concentrations that  
signal the presence of an unexpected positive reinforcer will bias the striatal Go cells 
toward activating (given that they are also receiving cortical afferent) but will 
simultaneously bias the NoGo cells against activation. The DA signal is therefore able to 
directly control the opening and closing of thalamocortical gates. In addition, because DA 
also modulates the activity-dependant plasticity of synapses, at the same time that the DA 
signal is directly controlling gating, it is also teaching the matrix cells how to control 
gating on their own in similar future circumstances, by strengthening the synaptic 
associations between the cortical input to the striatum (representing internal and external 
context that may be relevant to determining an adaptive gating strategy) and the Go or 
NoGo matrix cells that are activated as a result of the current DA signal. Therefore the 
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DA signal not only controls gating directly, but also teaches the striatum how to control 
gating in similar future circumstances when the DA system may not be engaged. 
Up to this point we have traced the control of the thalamic gating functions that 
mediate action selection and working memory updating back to the midbrain DA system. 
This system is commonly considered to signal reward prediction error (Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972). Midbrain DA cells (such as those of the SNc that project to the striatum) 
normally fire tonically, but the firing level transiently increases when an unexpected 
primary positive reinforcer occurs (e.g., a squirt of juice is often used in experiments with 
monkeys). If such a positive reinforcer is consistently preceded by another stimulus (e.g., 
a flashing light) then the DA burst will gradually "migrate" from the primary reinforcer to 
this predictive stimulus, which has become a secondary reinforcer. Once training is 
complete, the DA burst will occur only when the secondary reinforcer is presented; DA 
levels will remain constant when the primary reinforcer follows it, because the primary 
reinforcer is now fully expected. Should the secondary reinforcer then be presented but 
not followed by the primary reinforcer, there will be a dip in DA level at the time when 
the primary reinforcer is expected, indicating negative reward predicton error; the 
primary reinforer was expected but did not occur. The system works inversely for 
negative reinforcers; there is a dip in DA level when an unexpected negative primary or 
secondary reinforcer occurs, or a DA burst when an expected negative reinforcer does not 
occur. 
The dominant model of this system of signaling reward prediction error is the 
temporal difference (TD) learning algorithm (Sutton, 1988; Sutton & Barto, 1998). The 
TD algorithm determines the reward prediction error by taking the difference between the 
actual reward value at the current time plus estimated future reward (discounted in 
proportion to its distance in the future), and the estimated reward value for the current 
time. The reward prediction error is then used to modify the weights that determined the 
reward estimate for the current time, so that in a similar future circumstance they will 
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produce an estimate that more closely resembles the current actual reward value. By 
repeating this process over multiple trials, a reward prediction (corresponding to a DA 
burst in the brain) will incrementally step backward in time to correspond with the 
earliest secondary reinforcer that predicts a primary reinforcer.  
Although the TD learning algorithm was developed before DA response was 
measured in the brain, it closely reflects the dynamics of the midbrain's DA system. 
Because of this, early versions of the PBWM and associated DA gating models (e.g., 
O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000) leveraged the TD algorithm to generate the DA signal used 
by the model for learning and gating. However, the TD algorithm has several 
shortcomings. Because it relies on the sequential chaining of predictions through earlier 
and earlier time steps, any unpredictable event inserted within the learned sequence of 
events can break the chain and prevent learned reward predictions from being applied in 
the new situation. Biological reward prediction, on the other hand, is robust to the 
insertion of unpredictable events. The sequential chaining of TD learning also predicts 
that DA response would incrementally shift backward in time as a secondary reinforcer is 
learned, "travelling" backward over the intervening gap between the primary reinforcer 
and the secondary reinforcer. Instead, the biological DA response shows a gradual 
decrease in DA response to the primary reinforcer accompanied by a gradual increase in 
response to the secondary reinforcer, without any interpolation of the response through 
the intervening time. Finally, the TD learning algorithm does not have any clear 
functional mapping to biological components. 
For these reasons a biologically grounded model of DA response was developed, 
the primary value and learned value Pavlovian learning algorithm, or PVLV (O'Reilly et 
al, 2007). This model proposes that DA response is based on an opponent process 
involving two distinct brain systems that drive DA release in response to primary and 
secondary reinforcers, respectively, and a third system that inhibits DA release in 
response to any reinforcer that is already expected. The lateral hypothalamus is 
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hypothesized to signal midbrain neurons in the SNc and ventral tegmental area (VTA) to 
release DA in the areas to which they project, in response to the presence of a primary 
reinforcer. The central nucleus of the amygdala is thought to perform a similar role for 
secondary reinforcers, by learning what cortical representations are reliably associated 
with primary reinforcers and signaling the SNc and VTA when such representations are 
active. These systems are complemented by cells in the striosomes of the ventral striatum 
which learn what cortical representations reliably predict both primary and secondary 
reinforcers, and, via projections to the SNc and VTA, inhibit DA release at the time when 
a reinforcer is predicted to occur. This results in a DA burst occurring only in the 
presence of a primary or secondary reinforcer that has not been predicted, because any 
potential DA burst is cancelled out if the reinforcer is predicted. This also results in a dip 
in the tonic DA release when a reinforcer is predicted, but does not occur. Learning in 
this system occurs by enabling Hebbian modification of synaptic weights only when a 
primary reinforcer is present or expected. The PVLV model is able to bootstrap a DA 
response system that mimics the dynamics of the biological system more closely than 
does the TD learning algorithm, and eliminates the TD algorithm's dependence on a 
fragile learned chain of events. In addition to training itself in this way, the DA response 
system generates the signal that is used by the basal ganglia to control and train the 
frontal thalamocortical gating system, driving cognitive and motor actions in a 
behaviorally adaptive manner that maximizes positive reinforcement and minimizes 
negative reinforcement. 
The neural models underlying PBWM and PVLV were abstracted and 
implemented as computational models using the Leabra point neuron connectionist 
architecture (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; O'Reilly, Munakata et al 2012; O'Reilly, Hazy 
et al, 2012), an evolution of the influential parallel distributed processing (PDP) 
framework (Rumelhart et al, 1986; McClelland et al, 1986). A Leabra network typically 
employs multiple regions of model units connected bidirectionally and hierarchically. 
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Within a region, local inhibition (simulated using a kWTA function) enforces sparse 
activation; this competitive effect combined with Hebbian learning results in sparse 
distributed representations in which individual units come to represent distinct high 
probability features or combinations of features (e.g., Rumehart & Zipser, 1985). This 
aspect of the architecture closely resembles the CLA's spatial pooler, as described above. 
An individual Leabra unit is considered to correspond in its connectivity and response 
properties to a single cortical minicolumn (O'Reilly, Hazy et al, 2012); this differs from 
the CLA, which treats the different cells within a minicolumn as representing the same 
feedforward input but within different temporal contexts. Whereas the CLA's temporal 
pooler employs this system to generate invariant representations in an unsupervised 
manner by superimposing the highest probability predictions that result from a given 
input, Leabra models rely on the addition of error-driven supervised learning to generate 
invariant representations. However, the issue of how invariant representations are 
generated may be put aside for the purpose of this discussion, as the basic PBWM and 
PVLV models are trained entirely using Hebbian synaptic modification, modulated by a 
DA signal in order to effect reinforcement based learning. 
An instructive example of the function of the PBWM and PVLV models is in 
their application to a response task with hierarchical structure (Frank & Badre, 2012). 
The task, adapted from an earlier study performed with human subjects (Badre et al, 
2010), involves a series of trials in which the subject is shown an image, and then, after a 
short delay, must press one of 3 buttons in response (Figure 4). Every image is selected 
from the same set of 18 images, each of which maps uniquely to one correct response. 
After each trial the subject receives feedback on whether their response was correct, with 
the goal of learning the mappings and providing as many correct responses as possible. 
Images vary along three dimensions: there are three object shapes, three object 
orientations, and two possible colors of a square that frames the object. The experiment 
consists of two epochs. In the first epoch, called the "flat" condition, there is no 
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structured rule that governs the mappings of image to correct response, and so each 
mapping must be learned individually. In the second, "hierarchical" condition, however, 
there is hierarchical structure to the mapping rule, which may be exploited by the subject 
in order to speed up learning of the mappings: if an image is framed in one color, then its 
object shape alone determines the correct response mapping; if it is framed in the other 
color then its object orientation alone determines the mapping (Figure 5). If this 
hierarchical structure is exploited, then fewer individual mappings need be learned. A 
model based on PBWM and PVLV was constructed for this task, and both its 
performance and neural dynamics were compared with those of human subjects. 
As an approximation of the thalamic relay gating system, a simplified basal 
ganglia model is used which is composed of a set of Go and NoGo striatal units 
corresponding to each representation being gated. The relative activation of Go versus 
NoGo units determines whether a gate is opened or closed. The activity of each Go or 
NoGo unit is driven by input it receives from one of the model's cortical regions. The 
synaptic weights of these input connections are trained using a Hebbian rule modulated 
by the DA signal generated by the PVLV model, which is based on the positive or 
negative feedback received after each trial. DA bursts bias Go cells toward activating, 
and train their input connections so that they will be more likely to activate when they 
receive similar cortical input in the future. Conversely, DA dips bias NoGo cells to 
activate, and train their input connections. The result is that the basal ganglia model 
learns to open and close its gates in response to patterns of cortical input, so as to 
maximize positive reinforcement. Each gate system used in this model has three separate 
sets of striatal units, so that it can independently gate output to three different sets of 
cortical units (corresponding to separate "stripes" of frontal cortex) used to represent the 
three visual attributes of a stimulus image (object shape, object orientation, and frame 
color). This allows a gate system to pass one or more attributes through to influence 
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response selection in a given trial, while not passing through other attributes that are 
irrelevant to response selection and could otherwise interfere if passed through. 
The architecture of this model's network is shown in Figure 6. For this task, four 
separate gate systems are employed, to perform several different functions. The model 
includes a visual input region with eight localist units, one representing each possible 
attribute of a stimulus image (three object shapes, three object orientations, and two 
frame colors). There is also an output region, with three localist units representing the 
three possible responses. These regions are connected via the first thalamic gate, which is 
used to control response selection based on the probabilities of positive reinforcement 
given a representation of the current input state which it receives from another region that 
corresponds to the output of dorsal premotor cortex. In this model, dorsal premotor cortex 
is represented as two separate regions. The first, PMd maintain, corresponds to layers 2/3 
of premotor cortex and is capable of active maintenance of the input it receives. It 
receives afferent from the model's visual input area, and this afferent is input gated by a 
second thalamic gate. This gate learns which stimulus attributes should be gated into 
active maintenance within PMd maintain, based on the probability that their maintenance 
will lead to positive reinforcement. A second region, PMd output, corresponds to layer 5 
of the same area of premotor cortex. The flow of information from PMd maintain to PMd 
output is gated by a third thalamic gate. In this way, the updating of an actively 
maintained representation is separated from the output of that information to other areas. 
It is then PMd output that provides contextual information to the response gate that 
controls action selection. 
In order to be able to exploit the response rule structure of the hierarchical task 
condition, the model includes another active maintenance region representing a more 
anterior section of premotor cortex, and capable of storing higher level task information 
that is used to contextualize gating at the lower level. This prePMd output region receives 
input directly from the model's visual input region, but that input is gated by a fourth 
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thalamic gate. This gate learns what stimuli, when maintained in this higher order context 
buffer, is predictive of reward. The output of prePMd output is then sent to the PMd 
output gate, to provide context for its decisions about what stimulus dimensions to expose 
to the response gate.  
When there is latent hierarchical structure in the response rules, the architecture of 
this model allows it to discover and exploit that structure. The prePMd gate learns to gate 
the frame color information into active maintenance in prePMd output. The frame color 
determines whether it is the object shape or orientation that maps to the correct response, 
and so the frame color is high level task information that is useful for contextualizing the 
lower level decision of which stimulus attribute to base a response upon. Because the 
maintenance of this information in prePMd output tends to lead to a greater probability of 
correct response and of positive reinforcement, the prePMd gate learns to gate in and 
maintain just the frame color information. In the same way, the PMd input gate would 
learn to maintain only the object shape and orientation information, and the PMd output 
gate, responding to the frame color information sent to it by prePMd output, would learn 
to output only the task appropriate object attribute: object shape in the case of the first 
frame color, or object orientation in the case of the second frame color. The response gate 
will now receive from PMd output only the information about the relevant object 
attribute, which greatly simplifies the task of learning the correct response mappings. 
This computational model embodies a number of the functional principles 
common to the frameworks of frontal cortical function discussed above. Its abstracted 
thalamocortical gates are employed in several different ways that correspond to their 
proposed roles in modulating activity in the frontal cortex. The response gate is used to 
select a motor action and activate the representation of that action in the motor area. The 
PMd input gate and the prePMD gate are each used to select which representation will be 
gated into active maintenance within a cortical area. The PMd output gate selects which 
maintained representations will be allowed to influence other brain areas downstream, in 
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the manner of a top-down attentional effect, and enables representations to be actively 
maintained without necessarily being output to other areas. Finally, the separate but 
complementary functions of the PMd and prePMd regions, such that the prePMd region 
maintains high order task information while PMd maintains lower order task information 
and uses the high order information to determine what lower order information to project 
downstream, reflects empirical findings that more anterior areas of frontal cortex are 
involved in learning abstract, higher order task information (e.g., Koechlin et al. 2000, 
2003; Christoff et al, 2009). Learning in each gate at every level of this model is 
modulated by the DA system's reward prediction error signal, such that DA bursts 
promote Go learning and DA dips promote NoGo learning. An initial bias toward Go 
activity promotes exploratory gating activity, and launches a "walk" through the space of 
gating responses in search of maximized reward. This bootstrapping mechanism is 
effective in guiding executive control of working memory, attention and response toward 
exploiting the hierarchical rule structure in this task. 
In summary, while many aspects of frontal cortical function remain poorly 
understood, a prevailing perspective holds that frontal areas differ from one another 
principally in their connectivity, which determines the nature of the representations that 
they are capable of generating, as well as maintaining in activation, so as to influence 
processing in connected regions. The recurrent thalamocortical relays that are unique to 
frontal areas, and that appear to be modulated by the basal ganglia reinforcement learning 
system, provide a gating mechanism, similar to a production system, by which the flow 
of information between frontal areas may be adaptively switched on or off with high 
spatial resolution. Converging lines of evidence suggest that this context sensitive gating 
system mediates competitive action selection, the updating of working memory, and the 
control of top-down attentional effects. While several other models have been developed 
based on a similar biological and computational framework (e.g., Brown et al, 2004; 
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Stewart et al, 2012), the family of models to which PBWM belongs is a particularly well 
developed and diversely applied embodiment of this set of principles.  
 
Toward a Comprehensive Model of Cortical Function 
 
Though it plays a primary role in those aspects of perception, cognition, and 
behavior that are most strongly identified with human intelligence, the cerebral cortex is a 
fairly recent evolutionary addendum to a labyrinthine organization of subcortical 
structures. As such, it is not unexpected that the cortex, far from being an independent 
"ivory tower" of higher intelligence, works in close collaboration with its 
phylogenetically more ancient neighbors. Both posterior and frontal cortex engage with 
the hippocampus for the storage and retrieval of episodic memory, and with the 
cerebellum for the development of coordinated motor control. Posterior cortex receives 
preprocessed sensory information from the thalamus. Frontal cortex, being in charge of 
behavior, relies heavily on its interactions with subcortical nuclei such as the 
hypothalamus, amygdala and other limbic structures to inform the action selection 
process with motivation and emotion. In addition, the system of thalamic relay loops that 
is unique to the frontal cortex allows the flow of activity between areas to be selectively 
gated by the basal ganglia reinforcement learning system, so as to base both motor and 
cognitive actions in the adaptive pursuit of maximized reward and minimized 
punishment. Clearly, the function of the cerebral cortex cannot be comprehensively 
studied in isolation; it is an important part of a much larger system. 
By understanding how cortical function depends upon interactions with these 
subcortical systems, we can approach the problem of separating out what specific 
processes a general cortical algorithm would be responsible for, if such an algorithm 
exists. As we have seen, the frontal cortex performs roles that are very different from 
those of the posterior cortex. These differences can substantially be explained, however, 
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by differences in connectivity. Most crucially, the thalamocortical gating system mediates 
the unique role of the frontal cortex in driving cognitive and motor behavior. One area 
where there is strong evidence of an intrinsic functional difference between frontal and 
posterior cortex is with regards to the bistability and highly recurrent local connectivity 
that appear to underlie active maintenance of frontal representations (Levitt et al, 1993; 
Kritzer & Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Wang, 1999). In other respects, however, frontal and 
posterior cortex may simply be performing the same kinds of operations upon different 
inputs.  
In this section I return to the consideration of what processes make up a plausible 
candidate for a general cortical algorithm. Using the HTM CLA as a starting point, I will 
examine how it may be adapted to fulfill the requirements of both posterior and frontal 
cortical function. 
Sequence Storage 
The basal ganglia have often been implicated in the storage of motor sequences 
(e.g., Graybiel, 1995; Cromwell & Berridge, 1996). However, more recent experimental 
evidence suggests that while the basal ganglia is involved in the learning of novel motor 
sequences, output from the basal ganglia is not required in order to carry out well learned 
motor sequences (Desmurget & Turner, 2010). In addition, conditions that compromise 
basal ganglia function in humans, such as Parkinson's disease, impair the ability to 
initiate action (as would be expected from the gating model discussed above) but do not 
impair the ability to carry out a motor sequence once action has been induced (O'Reilly & 
Munakata, 2000). 
If motor sequences are not stored in the basal ganglia, then like perceptual 
sequences they are likely stored in the cortex itself, perhaps in cooperation with re-entrant 
thalamocortical loops (e.g., Granger, 2006). According to the CLA model, one of the 
main functions of cortex is to record the temporal context in which spatial patterns of 
activation occur, so as to be able to predict and reactivate those patterns at the appropriate 
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time based on learned sequences of activity. Top-down connections from layer 5 of one 
cortical area to layer 1 of a hierarchically lower area may be organized in such a way that 
when a static pattern representing a temporal sequence is strongly activated in the higher 
area, each element of that sequence is played out over time in the lower area. In this way, 
output gating of a particular cognitive or motor sequence representation in an area of 
frontal cortex could initiate the execution, in hierarchically lower areas, of the learned 
sequence of actions represented by that single, static pattern of activity. This ability to 
collapse a sequence of events that is extended over time into a static pattern of activation 
at a higher level may lie behind one of the primary functions of the frontal cortex, that of 
integrating temporally separated events and contingencies (Fuster, 1997). 
In addition, such a method of recording sequences and generating predictions 
based on temporal context may make an important contribution to the DA signal system 
discussed above. The PVLV model is based upon simultaneous associations rather than 
predictions (O'Reilly et al, 2007). Because of this, a stimulus representation must be 
actively maintained through to the time at which the primary reinforcement event occurs, 
in order for that stimulus to be learned as a secondary reinforcer. The frontal cortex active 
maintenance system is suggested to be responsible for this. However, it is not yet 
empirically clear whether in the brain a stimulus representation must be actively 
maintained in order to be learned as a secondary reinforcer. A CLA-like prediction 
mechanism, either implemented in the cortex or the amygdala, would allow predictive 
associations to be learned between a secondary reinforcer and a primary reinforcer, 
without the need for the representation of the secondary reinforcer to remain active until 
the primary reinforcer occurs in order for this learning process to take place. 
Corticocortical Connectivity 
While the Zeta 1 implementation of HTM incorporated a top down pathway of 
excitation in order to meet the requirements of its equivalence with Bayesian belief 
propagation, the CLA implementation has not yet been used with top down projections in 
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any published study. Clearly in order to model a variety of cortical functions, including 
attentional bias and Bayesian inference, top down excitation would need to be integrated 
with the CLA. 
Because CLA cells have three different states (inactive, active and predictive) the 
question of how to connect two CLA regions isn't as straightforward as it can be for 
networks with cells that are either active or inactive. Bottom up connections, 
corresponding to projections from layer 2/3 in one cortical area to layer 4 in a 
hierarchically higher area, would transmit excitation from both active and predictive 
cells. This is necessary in order for both the active input representation and the high 
probability predictions that result from that input representation to be passed forward as a 
single, overlaid whole. The feedforward projection of a single representation combining 
both the current input and its high probability predictions is at the heart of the CLA's 
abilities to generate invariant representations and to compress temporal sequences into 
static spatial patterns. 
Top down connections, corresponding to projections from layer 5 in one cortical 
area to layer 1 (and from there to deeper layers) in a hierarchically lower area, have 
different requirements. While the feedforward pathway compresses time, the feedback 
pathway expands it. Top down connections should therefore transmit excitation from 
cells in the active state, but not from cells in the predictive state. In this way, as a 
temporal sequence plays out in a given cortical area, only the currently active 
representation in that sequence will be projected top down to a lower area. That lower 
area may itself represent a subsequence, and so on; multilevel sequences can be played 
out where each successively lower cortical level represents briefer but more detailed 
sequences than the level above it. 
Many details of what would make up the most effective architecture of CLA 
regions in order to accurately model cortex remain unresolved. The several distinct 
cortical layers differ in connectivity and cytoarchitecture, and may represent various 
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transformations of the same pattern. The hierarchical frontal model discussed above 
(Frank & Badre, 2012), for example, treats layer 5 as representing a copy of layer 2/3, but 
modulated by a thalamocortical output gating function. There is also the question of 
where and how the activation of successive elements of a sequence are timed; Hawkins et 
al (2010) propose that layer 5 uses a thalamic timing signal available in layer 1 to control 
the precise timing of outputs. Finally, feedforward projections from a single cortical 
minicolumn may be sensitive to one or a small set of individual cells, and so transmit 
representations that vary with the temporal context of the active efferent pattern, or 
projections may act disjunctively for a large group of cells within one column, and so 
transmit a representation that is invariant to the temporal context of the active efferent 
pattern. Each of these methods have their own advantages, and it may be that different 
cortical areas vary in this parameter. 
Synaptic Learning 
As described above, the CLA's spatial pooler performs competitive Hebbian 
learning, with the result being that individual columns come to specialize in responding 
to particular spatial patterns of input that occur with high probability. To ensure that most 
columns do learn to represent some input pattern (and so are not "wasted"), a boosting 
mechanism increases the input sensitivity of columns that have been active with very low 
frequency. Conversely, the input sensitivity of columns that have been active with very 
high frequency is attenuated, to prevent columns from overgeneralizing to represent too 
wide a variety of input patterns. The principle motivating this dynamic modulation of 
input sensitivity is well founded; it does improve the quality of learning, and a similar 
approach is taken in analogous learning algorithms such as vector quantization. However, 
the CLA implementation of this boosting mechanism (Hawkins et al, 2010) is poorly 
specified and lacking in biological grounding, which resulted in a variety of ad hoc 
approaches being used by different CLA implementations.  
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The Leabra framework (O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; O'Reilly, Munakata et al, 
2012), which incorporates competitive Hebbian learning very similar to that of the CLA's 
spatial pooler, is a mature biologically based approach to modeling brain systems that has 
been very successful in modeling a variety of phenomena including the frontal and 
subcortical reinforcement learning mechanisms discussed above. As such, it may offer 
insights that are transferrable to the CLA, particularly in areas of close overlap such as 
competitive Hebbian learning. 
Recent versions of Leabra use a synaptic weight modification rule derived from a 
biologically detailed model of spike timing dependant plasticity (Urakubo et al, 2008). In 
Leabra's XCAL model, learning dynamics are captured by a piecewise linear function 
that is essentially a linearized version of the BCM synaptic learning model (Bienenstock 
et al, 1982). Synaptic weight change is a function of the product of the short term average 
activity of the presynaptic and postsynaptic neurons. If this value is above a given 
threshold, the weight of the synapse increases; otherwise it decreases. What is distinctive 
about this model is that it employs a floating threshold, whose value is based on the long 
term average activity of the postsynaptic neuron: the greater the long term activity, the 
higher the threshold, making weight decrease more likely than weight increase. 
Conversely, the lesser the long term activity, the lower the threshold, which favors weight 
increase over weight decrease. The result is a homeostatic drive toward a roughly equal 
distribution of activity among units, and so also a roughly equal division of the 
representational space. This achieves the same aim as the CLA's boosting mechanism in a 
principled manner that is based on detailed biological theory and parallels the proven 
BCM model. It would therefore be worthwhile exploring the possibility of incorporating 
this technique into the CLA's spatial pooler.  
It is worth mentioning another point of connection between Leabra and the CLA. 
From the start, Leabra has utilized a combination of competitive Hebbian "model 
learning" and error driven "task learning". Competitive learning is well suited to the 
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unsupervised extraction of statistically common patterns from input data, while 
supervised error driven learning is useful for teaching a network arbitrary mappings from 
input data to an output response, as in category learning. Earlier versions of Leabra used 
the GeneRec algorithm (O'Reilly, 1996) for error driven learning, a biologically plausible 
equivalent to the influential backpropagation algorithm (Rumelhart et al, 1986). Synaptic 
learning with GeneRec is fundamentally different from Hebbian learning. It requires that 
learning trials be composed of two phases. In the "minus" phase, the network is given an 
input and allowed to settle to its own resting activity state. In the "plus" phase, the 
supervised, "correct" output activity is clamped in an output region. Its influence feeds 
back through the network, which is allowed to settle to a new resting activity state given 
the additional output constraint. Changes in synaptic weights are then derived, for each 
trial, from the differences in the activity of units between the minus and plus phases.  
Recent versions of Leabra have employed a much more elegant and biologically 
motivated way of integrating error driven learning with competitive Hebbian learning. It 
begins by reframing the role of error driven learning: more specific than learning input-
output mappings, error driven learning may be thought of as generating predictions and 
then learning from the difference between those predictions and the actual outcomes 
(McClelland, 1994). By viewing error driven learning as a sequence of temporal events in 
this way, the same XCAL learning rule that results in Hebbian synaptic weight changes 
can also be adapted to error driven learning, by simply basing the threshold dynamics on 
a faster timescale. Rather than the threshold, which determines what level of activity is 
required to increase vs. decrease synaptic weight, being based on the long term average 
activity of the postsynaptic unit (which provides the homeostatic "boosting" effect for 
Hebbian learning), the threshold may be based on a medium term timescale and so reflect 
the predictive activity that occurs after an input is received but before the outcome is 
received. If a representation is predicted, its synaptic thresholds rise, making decreases in 
synaptic weight likely if the outcome does not match the prediction. If a representation is 
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not predicted, its synaptic thresholds lower, making increases in synaptic weight likely if 
the outcome matches this unpredicted representation. Modifying the thresholds in this 
way results in error driven learning, such that future predictive activity in response to the 
same input will more closely reflect the actual outcome. 
This error driven method of shaping the learning of predictions by contrasting 
predictions with outcomes is closely related to the process used by the CLA's temporal 
pooler. The Leabra system continues to depend on the use of separate populations of 
units to represent input and output, respectively. It no longer requires a strict separation 
between a minus and plus phase, but it does require some kind of learning signal to be 
provided when an outcome occurs, so that it may be contrasted with the immediately 
previous predictive activity and change synaptic weights accordingly. The CLA 
overcomes both of these limitations by proposing two separate cell states, active and 
predictive. This allows the same population of units to represent both prediction and 
outcome simultaneously, and so also to learn continuously rather than in discrete phases 
or when an explicit learning signal is provided. Nonetheless, the Leabra method of 
learning predictions using fast manipulation of synaptic learning thresholds may offer 
valuable insights and biological grounding to research using the CLA. It may be a 
hopeful sign of progress being made in the understanding of cortical function, that these 
two biologically based architectures appear to be moving in a direction of convergence. 
Abstract Representations 
One aspect of frontal cortical function that has been given less attention than it is 
due, both in this review and in the literature in general, is the biological basis of the 
generation and manipulation of abstract frontal representations. Response properties of 
some PFC cells have been shown to correspond with abstract rules (Wallis et al, 2001), 
and models such as those of Norman & Shallice (1980, 1986; Shallice, 1982; Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991, 1996), Grafman (2002) and Fuster (1997) have emphasized the 
requirement that frontal cortex dynamically generate and manipulate abstract 
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representations of concepts, rules and actions, and use these representations to structure 
behavior. Computational models have been developed with the aim of combining the 
representational strengths of symbolic cognitive models with the dynamics, symbol 
grounding and biological plausibility of connectionist models (e.g., Jilk et al, 2008). 
However, there remains a wide gap in understanding separating the two perspectives. 
How are abstract representations of relationship roles, standing in not for perceptual 
objects but for a set of contextual relationships between objects (or even between other 
abstract roles), generated? How are other appropriate representations mapped to these 
roles, in the manner of variables filling slots (Anderson, 1983)? How are multiple 
representations, or even multiple instances of the same representation, combined 
compositionally into a common schema (Jackendoff, 2002)? The answers to these 
questions are still far from clear, but the possibility that the cortex implements an 
algorithm such as the CLA that employs temporal slowness to generate invariant 
representations suggests a novel approach to these issues. 
As described above, the CLA generates low level visual representations with 
spatial invariance by overlaying the sparse active representation of a given visual feature 
with the predictive representations of those visual features that are subsequently active 
with the highest probability. For a low level visual feature, this would typically result in 
an overlay of the representations of the same visual feature at a number of nearby spatial 
locations (Figure 2). When the same process is applied to higher level representations of 
visual objects, each composed of groups of spatially invariant features, then because 
spatial invariance has already been extracted, the transitions of activity that would occur 
with the highest probability would be from one visual object to another nearby object, as 
the result of shifts in visual attention. In this way, the representation of a given visual 
object would come to include the predictive activity of representations of nearby visual 
objects. The visual representation of 'nose', for example, may come to include predictive 
activity of nearby objects such as 'eye' and 'mouth' that are commonly the subject of shifts 
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in visual attention from 'nose'. Some fraction of the active cells that participate in the 
representation of a visual object would in fact be representing the visual context of the 
object, rather than the attributes of the object itself. Once this is the case, then so long as 
the contextual relationships are preserved, the visual attributes can be altered while 
maintaining a substantial part of the object's active representation. This would allow for 
the processing of visual metaphors such as the face of a snowman, where the individual 
visual attributes are changed but their contextual relationships with one another remain. 
This same principle may be applied to frontal representations. In frontal cortex, 
transitions in activity from one representation to another do not necessarily depend on 
shifts in visual attention, but may also be controlled by the gating of thalamocortical 
relays as discussed above. Rather than transitioning with high probability between nearby 
objects, it is likely that frontal activity transitions with high probability between objects 
that are conceptually related due to being linked within the same frontal sequences or 
schemas. If a CLA-like mechanism is operating in frontal cortex, then the frontal 
representation of an object may come to include cell activity that is representative of that 
object's conceptual contexts, rather than just the attributes of the object itself. Different 
objects that share conceptual contexts with one another would therefore come to have 
partially shared frontal representations. This shared representation, representing only 
shared conceptual context, is a purely abstract representation. As a simple example, the 
abstract concept 'better' might be represented by a positive affective value as well as a 
predictive representation of an attentional shift to a different representation associated 
with a negative affective value. Once abstract representations have been extracted in this 
way, the frontal lobe's reinforcement driven mechanisms for gating and sustaining 
activation could be employed to combine multiple representations into a common 
schema, run perceptual simulations (cf. Barsalou et al, 2003) to project the ramifications 
of these new combined representations and expand their repertoires of contextual 
relationships, and manipulate them in other ways.  
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Clearly this is a speculative framework. It has yet to be modeled or empirically 
tested. But it is an example of one way that a cortical model integrating CLA-like 
functionality could offer new approaches to a longstanding problem. It may be that the 
same mechanism that in posterior cortex produces representations of object identity that 
are invariant to visual transformation, is employed by frontal cortex to produce 
representations of contextual relationships that are invariant to object identity. 
 
Conclusions 
 
While there is an intriguing body of evidence pointing to the possibility of its 
existence, any attempt to identify a common algorithm that characterizes the processing 
carried out by all areas of cortex must confront the great variety of functions in which the 
cortex participates. In this review, I have singled out the HTM CLA as a model of 
cortical function that is compatible with biological data and that encompasses many 
properties associated with cortical function, including the use of sparse distributed 
representations, hierarchical Bayesian inference, and predictive coding. Perhaps most 
distinctively, the CLA offers an explanation for how representations, at higher levels, 
become increasingly invariant to rapidly changing stimulus attributes. By exploiting the 
principle of temporal slowness to solve this problem, the CLA provides an alternative to 
the hard-coded connections or supervised error-driven learning employed by other 
systems to generate visual representations invariant to transformations of position, scale, 
rotation, pose, and so on, and also suggests a process by which abstract representations of 
contextual relationship roles may be generated in frontal cortex. 
If the HTM CLA is to be considered a candidate for a universal cortical 
algorithm, it must be well suited not only to the requirements of the posterior cortical 
functions to which the HTM models have most often been applied, but also to the 
requirements of frontal cortical function. By examining the nature of the close 
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interactions between frontal cortex and subcortical structures, it is possible to separate out 
the set of functions that the cortex itself may be responsible for, from those functions that 
emerge from subcortical interactions. A relatively simple model of the interactions 
between frontal cortex and the cortico-thalamic relay loops controlled by the basal 
ganglia reinforcement learning system (Frank & Badre, 2012) demonstrates that 
interactions between frontal areas and subcortical structures are capable of explaining a 
wide range of control functions attributed to frontal cortex, including the hierarchical 
selection of both strategy and response, top-down attentional effects, and the updating of 
actively maintained working memory representations. These results suggest that the only 
function intrinsic to cortex that is necessary to accommodate frontal functions, in addition 
to those also required to accommodate posterior functions, is the ability to support the 
active maintenance of representations.  
Typically connectionist models of frontal cortical function have been weakest in 
terms of the richness and versatility of their representations. Besides providing for 
competitive Hebbian learning which mediates the representation of groups of commonly 
co-occurring inputs, the CLA offers two additional forms of representation that both take 
advantage of its ability to predictively activate representations of expected future inputs. 
First, it learns repeated sequences of inputs and re-represents them as static patterns at 
higher levels, which allows for the sort of hierarchical compression and expansion of 
time that is well suited to both perceptual and executive processing. Second, CLA 
representations that, as a set, have a high probability of alternating among one another in 
being active, come to incorporate predictive sub-representations of one another, and so 
come to be partially overlapping. This effect provides for perceptual invariance, may 
serve to unite related perceptual and conceptual representations into common schemas, 
and may facilitate the extraction of abstract representations. In these ways, the principles 
underlying the CLA may offer a path toward providing the representational strengths that 
have so far eluded connectionist models of frontal cortical function. 
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The HTM CLA is early in development and has yet to be widely researched, 
applied, or empirically tested. I do not propose that the CLA in its current form is a 
complete or accurate realization of a universal cortical algorithm. I do suggest, however, 
that the principles embodied by the CLA offer valuable insights toward the solutions of a 
number of longstanding problems regarding cortical function. There are many clear 
opportunities for extending the power, biological grounding and practical applicability of 
the CLA, such as in the integration of important insights from complementary 
biologically-based cortical models and the coupling of the CLA with models of 
subcortical functions. For these reasons I believe that further research using the CLA 
stands to yield valuable results. 
78 
References 
 
Alexander, G.E., DeLong, M.R., & Strick, P.L. (1986). Parallel organization of 
functionally segregated circuits linking basal ganglia and cortex. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 9, 357–381. 
Alink, A., Schwiedrzik, C.M., Kohler, A., Singer, W., & Muckli, L. (2010). Stimulus 
predictability reduces responses in primary visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 
30, 2960–2966. 
Amodio, D.M., Frith, C.D. (2006). Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social 
cognition. Nat Rev Neurosci, 7, 268 –277. 
Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Asaad, W.F., Rainer, G., Miller, E.K. (1998). Neural activity in the primate prefrontal 
cortex during associative learning. Neuron, 21, 1399–407. 
Asaad, W.F., Rainer, G., & Miller, E.K. (2000). Task specific neural activity in the 
primate prefrontal cortex. J. Neurophysiol., 84, 451–59. 
Atkinson, R.C., Shiffrin, R.M. (1968). Human memory: A proposed system and its 
control processes. In Spence, K.W., Spence, J.T. eds. The psychology of learning and 
motivation (Volume 2). New York: Academic Press. pp. 89–195. 
Baddeley, A.D., & Hitch, G.J. (1974). Working memory. In G.A. Bower (Ed.), Recent 
advances in learning and motivation (Vol. 8, pp. 47–90). New York: Academic Press. 
Baddeley, A.D. (1986). Working Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baddeley, A.D. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11), 417-423. 
Badre, D., Kayser, A., D’Esposito, M. (2010). Frontal cortex and the discovery of 
abstract action rules. Neuron, 66, 315–326. 
79 
Bair, W., Cavanaugh, J.R., & Movshon, J.A. (2003). Time course and time-distance 
relationships for surround suppression in macaque V1 neurons. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 23, 7690–7701. 
Bar, M. (2009). The proactive brain: memory for predictions. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 
364(1521), 1235-1243. 
Barbas, H., & Pandya, D.N. (1989). Architecture and intrinsic connections of the 
prefrontal cortex in the rhesus monkey. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 286(3), 
353–375. 
Barsalou, L.W., Kyle Simmons, W., Barbey, A.K., Wilson, C.D. (2003). Grounding 
conceptual knowledge in modality-specific systems. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 84–91. 
Banich, M.T., Milham, M.P., Atchley, R., Cohen, N.J., Webb A, et al. (2000). Prefrontal 
regions play a predominant role in imposing an attentional “set”: evidence from 
fMRI. Cogn. Brain Res., 10, 1–9. 
Baker, S.C, Rogers, R.D., Owen, A.M., Frith, C.D., Dolan, R.J., Frackowiak, R.S.J., & 
Robbins, T.W. (1996). Neural systems engaged by planning: A Pet study of the 
Tower of London task. Neuropsychologia, 34, 515. 
Barbas, H. (2006). Organization of the principal pathways of prefrontal lateral, medial, 
and orbitofrontal cortices in primates and implications for their collaborative 
interaction in executive functions. The frontal lobes. Development, function and 
pathology, 21-68. Cambridge University Press. 
Bastos, A.M., Usrey, W.M., Adams, R.A., Mangun, G.R., Fries, P., Friston, K.J. (2012).  
Canonical microcircuits for predictive coding. Neuron, 76, 695–711. 
Bedny, M., Dodell-Feder, D., Pascual-Leone, A., Fedorenko, E., & Saxe, R. (2011). 
Language processing in the occipital cortex of congenitally blind adults. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(11), 4429–
4434. 
80 
Bengio, Y. (2009). Learning deep architectures for AI. Foundations and Trends in 
Machine Learning, 2(1). 
Berkes, P. (2005). Temporal slowness as an unsupervised learning principle: self-
organization of complex-cell receptive fields and application to pattern recognition. 
Ph.D. dissertation, Humboldt University, Berlin. 
Bienenstock, E.L., Cooper, L.N., & Munro, P.W. (1982). Theory for the development of 
neuron selectivity: orientation specificity and binocular interaction in visual cortex. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 2(2), 32–48. 
Botvinick, M.M., Braver, T.S., Barch, D.M., Carter, C.S. & Cohen, J.D. (2001). Conflict 
monitoring and cognitive control. Psychol Rev, 108, 624–652. 
Braver, T.S., Cohen, J.D., eds. (2000). On the Control of Control: The Role of Dopamine 
in Regulating Prefrontal Function and Working Memory. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Brown, J.W., Bullock, D., & Grossberg, S. (2004). How laminar frontal cortex and basal 
ganglia circuits interact to control planned and reactive saccades. Neural Networks, 
17(4), 471-510. 
Bunge, S. A. (2004). How we use rules to select actions: a review of evidence from 
cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 4(4), 564-
579. 
Buonomano, D.V., Karmarkar, U.R. (2002). How do we tell time? Neuroscientist 8, 42-
51. 
Bussey, T. J., Wise, S. P., & Murray, E. A. (2002). Interaction of ventral and orbital 
prefrontal cortex with inferotemporal cortex in conditional visuomotor learning. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 116, 703-715. 
Buzo, A., Gray Jr, A., Gray, R., & Markel, J. (1980). Speech coding based upon vector 
quantization. Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, 28(5), 
562-574. 
81 
Callaway, E.M. (1998). Local circuits in primary visual cortex of the macaque monkey. 
Annual Review of Neuroscience. 21, 47–74. 
Carpenter, G. & Grossberg, S. A massively parallel architecture for a self-organizing 
neural pattern recognition. Machine. Comp. Vision, Graphics and Image Proc. 37, 
54-115. 
Chao, L.L., Knight, R.T. (1997). Prefrontal deficits in attention and inhibitory control 
with aging. Cereb. Cortex, 7, 63–9. 
Chellapilla, K., Puri, S. & Simard, P. (2006). High performance convolutional neural 
networks for document processing. In International Workshop on Frontiers in 
Handwriting Recognition. 
Chevalier, G., & Deniau, J.M. (1990). Disinhibition as a basic process in the expression 
of striatal functions. Trends in neurosciences, 13(7), 277-280. 
Christoff, K., Keramatian, K., Gordon, A.M., Smith, R. & Madler, B. (2009). Prefrontal 
organization of cognitive control according to levels of abstraction. Brain Res., 1286, 
94–105. 
Churchland, P.S., Sejnowski, T.J. (1992). The Computational Brain. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Ciresan, D., Meier, U., Masci, J., Gambardella, L. & Schmidhuber, J. (2011). Flexible, 
high performance convolutional neural networks for image classification. In 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 1237-1242. 
Ciresan, D., Meier, U., Masci, J., & Schmidhuber, J. (2012). Multi-column deep neural 
network for traffic sign classification. Neural Networks, 32, 333-338. 
Ciresan, D., Giusti, A., Gambardella, L., & Schmidhuber, J. (2012). Deep neural 
networks segment neuronal membranes in electron microscopy images. Advances in 
Neural Information Processing Systems, Lake Tahoe. 
82 
Ciresan, D., Meier, U., Schmidhuber, J. (2012). Multi-column deep neural networks for 
image classification. IEEE Conf. on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition 
(CVPR 2012). 
Cohen, J.D., Braver, T.S., O’Reilly, R.C. (1996). A computational approach to prefrontal 
cortex, cognitive control, and schizophrenia: Recent developments and current 
challenges. Philos. Trans. Roy. Soc. London B. 351, 1515–1527. 
Cohen, J.D., Barch, D.M., Carter, C.S., Servan-Schreiber, D. (1999). Schizophrenic 
deficits in the processing of context: converging evidence from three theoretically 
motivated cognitive tasks. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 108, 120–33. 
Colby, C.L., Duhamel, J.R., & Goldberg, M.E. (1996). Visual, presaccadic, and cognitive 
activation of single neurons in monkey lateral intraparietal area. Journal of 
neurophysiology, 76(5), 2841-2852. 
Constantinidis, C., Franowicz, M. N., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (2001). The sensory 
nature of mnemonic representation in the primate prefrontal cortex. Nature 
Neuroscience, 4, 311-316. 
Corbetta, M., Akbudak, E., Conturo, T.E., Snyder, A.Z., Ollinger, J.M., et al. (1998). A 
common network of functional areas for attention and eye movements. Neuron, 21, 
761–73. 
Corbetta, M., Miezin, F.M., Shulman, G.L., Petersen, S.E. (1993). A PET study of 
visuospatial attention. J. Neurosci., 13, 1202–26. 
Cox, D.D., Meier, P., Oertelt, N., & DiCarlo, J. (2005). ‘Breaking’ position-invariant 
object recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 8, 1145–1147. 
Cromwell, H.C., & Berridge, K.C. (1996). Implementation of action sequences by a 
neostriatal site: a lesion mapping study of grooming syntax. The Journal of 
neuroscience, 16(10), 3444-3458. 
DeFelipe, J., Alonso-Nanclares, L., Arellano, J.I. (2002). Microstructure of the neocortex: 
Comparative aspects. J Neurocytol, 31, 299–316. 
83 
Desimone, R. & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective attention. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 18, 193-222. 
Desmurget, M., & Turner, R.S. (2010). Motor sequences and the basal ganglia: 
kinematics, not habits. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(22), 7685-7690. 
D’Esposito, M., Ballard, D., Zarahn, E., & Aguirre, G. K. (2000). The role of prefrontal 
cortex in sensory memory and motor preparation: An event-related fMRI study. 
NeuroImage, 11, 400-408. 
de-Wit, L., Machilsen, B., & Putzeys, T. (2010). Predictive coding and the neural 
response to predictable stimuli. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(26), 8702-8703. 
Diamond, A., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S. (1989). Comparison of human infants and rhesus 
monkeys on Piaget’s AB task: Evidence for dependence on dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 74, 24-40. 
Dias, R., Robbins, T.W., Roberts, A.C. (1996). Primate analogue of the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test: effects of excitotoxic lesions of the prefrontal cortex in the marmoset. 
Behav. Neurosci., 110, 872–86. 
 DiCarlo, J. & Cox, D. (2007). Untangling invariant object recognition. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 11(8), 333-341. 
Dunbar K, Sussman D. (1995). Toward a cognitive account of frontal lobe function: 
simulating frontal lobe deficits in normal subjects. Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences, 769, 289–304. 
Duncan, J. (1986). Disorganization of behaviour after frontal lobe damage. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 3, 271–90. 
Etkin, A., Egner, T., Peraza, D.M., Kandel, E.R. & Hirsch, J. (2006). Resolving 
emotional conflict: a role for the rostral anterior cingulate cortex in modulating 
activity in the amygdala. Neuron, 51, 871– 882. 
Feldman, D.E. (2009). Synaptic mechanisms for plasticity in neocortex. Annual Review 
of Neuroscience. 32, 33–55 
84 
Felleman, D.J. & Van Essen, D.C. (1991). Distributed hierarchical processing in the 
primate cerebral cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 1, 1-47. 
Ferrier, D. (1874). Experiments on the brain of monkeys - No. 1. Proc. R. Soc. Lond, 23 
(156–163), 409–430. 
Ferrier, M. (2006). From Vision to Language: A Domain General Approach to Statistical 
Learning. Unpublished manuscript. 
Field, D.J. (1987). Relations between the statistics of natural images and the response 
properties of cortical cells. Journal of the Optical Society of America A, 4, 2379-
2394. 
Fink, G.R., Dolan, R.J., Halligan, P.W., Marshall, J.C., Frith, C.D. (1997). Space-based 
and object based visual attention: shared and specific neural domains. Brain, 120, 
2013–28. 
Fiser, J., & Aslin, R. N. (2002). Statistical learning of new visual feature combinations by 
infants. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 99, 15822-15826. 
Földiák, P. (1991). Learning invariance from transformation sequences. Neural 
Computation, 3, 194–200. 
Földiák, P. (2002). Sparse coding in the primate cortex. In M.A. Arbib (Ed.), The 
Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks (2nd ed.) (pp. 1064-1068). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Forbes, C.E., & Grafman, J. (2010). The Role of the Human Prefrontal Cortex in Social 
Cognition and Moral Judgment. Annual review of neuroscience, 33, 299-324. 
Frank, M.J., & Badre, D. (2012). Mechanisms of hierarchical reinforcement learning in 
corticostriatal circuits 1: computational analysis. Cerebral cortex, 22(3), 509-526. 
Frank, M.J., Loughry, B., & O’Reilly, R.C. (2001). Interactions between frontal cortex 
and basal ganglia in working memory: a computational model. Cognitive, Affective, & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 1(2), 137-160. 
85 
Frank, M.J. & O'Reilly, R.C. (2006). A mechanistic account of striatal dopamine function 
in human cognition: Psychopharmacological studies with cabergoline and 
haloperidol. Behavioral Neuroscience, 120, 497-517. 
Frank, M.J., Santamaria, A., O'Reilly, R. & Willcutt, E. (2007). Testing computational 
models of dopamine and noradrenaline dysfunction in Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder. Neuropsychopharmacology, 32, 1583-99. 
Frank, M.J., Seeberger, L. & O'Reilly, R.C. (2004). By carrot or by stick: Cognitive 
reinforcement learning in Parkinsonism. Science, 306, 1940-1943. 
Friston, K. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B: Biol. 
Sci., 360, 815–836 
Fukushima, K. (1988). Neocognitron: A Hierarchical Neural Network Capable of Visual 
Pattern Recognition. Neural Networks, 1(2), 119-130. 
Fuster, J.M. (1973). Unit activity in prefrontal cortex during delayed-response 
performance: neuronal correlates of transient memory. J. Neurophysiol, 36, 61–78. 
Fuster, J.M. (1980). The prefrontal cortex. Ney York: Raven Press. 
Fuster, J.M. (1997). The prefrontal cortex, 3rd edn. New York: Lippincott-Raven. 
Fuster, J.M. (1999). Cognitive functions of the frontal lobes. In Miller, B.L., Cummings, 
J.L., eds. The human frontal lobes: Functions and disorders. New York, NY, US: 
Guilford Press. pp. 187-195. 
Fuster, J.M., Bauer, R.H., Jervey, J.P. (1982). Cellular discharge in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex of the monkey in cognitive tasks. Exp. Neurol., 77, 679–94. 
Garrido, M.I., Kilner, J.M., Kiebel, S.J., & Friston, K.J. (2007). Evoked brain responses 
are generated by feedback loops. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 104, 20961–20966. 
Garrido, M.I., Kilner, J.M., Stephan, K.E., & Friston, K.J. (2009). The mismatch 
negativity: a review of underlying mechanisms. Clin. Neurophysiol. 120, 453–463. 
Gehring, W.J. & Willoughby, A.R. (2002). The medial frontal cortex and the rapid 
processing of monetary gains and losses. Science, 295, 2279 –2282. 
86 
George, D. (2008). How the brain might work: A hierarchical and temporal model for 
learning and recognition. Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University. 
George, D., Hawkins, J. (2005). A hierarchical Bayesian model of invariant pattern 
recognition in the visual cortex. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on 
Neural Networks, 3, 1812–1817. 
George, D., Hawkins, J. (2009). Towards a mathematical theory of cortical micro-
circuits. PLoS Comput. Biol., 5(10). 
Gershberg, F.B., Shimamura, A.P. (1995). Impaired use of organizational strategies in 
free recall following frontal lobe damage. Neuropsychologia, 13, 1305–33. 
Goldman-Rakic, P.S. (1987). Circuitry of primate prefrontal cortex and regulation of 
behavior by representational memory. In Handbook of physiology, the nervous 
system, higher functions of the brain (ed. F. Plum), sect. I, vol. V, pp. 373-417. 
Bethesda, MD: American Physiological Society. 
Goldman-Rakic, P.S., Cools, A.R., & Srivastava, K. (1996). The prefrontal landscape: 
implications of functional architecture for understanding human mentation and the 
central executive [and Discussion]. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
of London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 351(1346), 1445-1453. 
Graf Estes, K., Evans, J. L., Alibali, M. W., Saffran, J. R. (2007). Can infants map 
meaning to newly segmented words? Psychological Science, 18, 254-259. 
Grafman, J. (2002). The structured event complex and the human prefrontal cortex. In 
Principles of Frontal Lobe Function, ed. D.T.H. Stuss, R.T. Knight, p. 616. 
Oxford/New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Granger, R. (2006). Engines of the brain: The computational instruction set of human 
cognition. AI Magazine, 27(2), 15. 
Graybiel, A.M. (1995). Building action repertoires: memory and learning functions of the 
basal ganglia. Current opinion in neurobiology, 5(6), 733-741. 
Grenander, U. (1993). General Pattern Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
87 
Gross, C.G., Rocha-Miranda, C., and Bender, D. (1972). Visual properties of neurons in 
the inferotemporal cortex of the macaque. Journal of Neurophysiology, 35, 96-111. 
Grossberg, S. (2007). Towards a unified theory of neocortex: laminar cortical circuits for 
vision and cognition. Progress in Brain Research. 165, 79–104. 
Guitton, D., Buchtel, H.A., & Douglas, R.M. (1985). Frontal lobe lesions in man cause 
difficulties in suppressing reflexive glances and in generating goal-directed saccades. 
Experimental Brain Research, 58, 455-472. 
Halsband, U., Passingham, R.E. (1985). Premotor cortex and the conditions for 
movement in monkeys. Behav. Brain Res., 18, 269–76. 
Hawkins, J., Ahmad, S., & Dubinsky, D. (2010). Hierarchical temporal memory 
including HTM cortical learning algorithms. Technical report, Numenta, CA. 
Hawkins, J. (2004). On Intelligence. New York: Henry Holt. 
Hazy, T.E., Pauli, W., Herd, S., others, & O’Reilly, R.C. (in preparation). Neural 
mechanisms of executive function: Biological substrates of active maintenance and 
adaptive updating. 
Hecht-Nielsen, R. (2007). Confabulation Theory. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
Herculano-Housel, S., Collins, C.E., Wang, P., Kaas, J. (2008). The basic nonuniformity 
of the cerebral cortex. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA, 105, 12593–12598. 
Hinton, G. E., McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1986). Distributed representations. 
In D. E. Rumelhart, J. L. McClelland, & the PDP Research Group (Eds.), Parallel 
distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure of cognition: Vol. 1. 
Foundations (pp. 77-109). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hinton, G. E., Osindero, S., and Teh, Y. W. (2006). A fast learning algorithm for deep 
belief nets. Neural Computation, 18, 1527-1554. 
Hirsch, J.A. & Martinez, L. M. (2006). Laminar processing in the visual cortical column. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 16, 377–384. 
88 
Hubel, D.H. and Wiesel, T.N. (1962). Receptive fields, binocular interaction and 
functional architecture in the cat’s visual cortex. Journal of Physiology, 160, 106–
154. 
Hubel, D.H., & Wiesel, T.N. (1968). Receptive fields and functional architecture of 
monkey striate cortex. The Journal of Physiology, 195, 215-243. 
Hupe´, J.M., James, A.C., Payne, B.R., Lomber, S.G., Girard, P., & Bullier, J. (1998). 
Cortical feedback improves discrimination between figure and background by V1, V2 
and V3 neurons. Nature 394, 784–787. 
Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Janowsky, J.S., Shimamura, A.P., Kritchevsky, M., Squire, L.R. (1989). Cognitive 
impairment following frontal lobe damage and its relevance to human amnesia. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 103, 548–60. 
Jilk, D.J., Lebiere, C., O’Reilly, R.C., & Anderson, J.R. (2008). SAL: An explicitly 
pluralistic cognitive architecture. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial 
Intelligence, 20(3), 197-218. 
Jin, D.Z., Fujii, N., Graybiel, A.M. (2009) Neural representation of time in cortico-basal 
ganglia circuits. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 19156–
19161. 
Kastner, S., De Weerd, P., Elizondo, I., Desimone, R., Ungerleider, L.G. (1998). 
Mechanisms of spatial attention in human extrastriate cortex as revealed by functional 
MRI. Soc. Neurosci. Abstr., 24, 1249. 
Kastner, S., Ungerleider, L.G. (2000). Mechanisms of visual attention in the human 
cortex. Annu. Rev. Neurosci., 23, 315–41. 
Kaufer, D.I., & Lewis, D.A. (1999). Frontal lobe anatomy and cortical connectivity. The 
human frontal lobes, 27-44. New York: Guilford Press. 
89 
Kirkham, N. Z., Slemmer, J., A., & Johnson, S. P. (2002). Visual statistical learning in 
infancy: evidence for a domain general learning mechanism. Cognition, 83, B35-B42. 
Kodaka, Y., Mikami, A., Kubota, K. (1997). Neuronal activity in the frontal eye field of 
the monkey is modulated while attention is focused onto a stimulus in the peripheral 
visual field, irrespective of eye movement. Neurosci. Res., 28, 291–98. 
Koechlin, E., Corrado, G., Pietrini, P., Grafman, J. (2000). Dissociating the role of the 
medial and lateral anterior prefrontal cortex in human planning. Proc Natl Acad Sci U 
S A. 97,7651–7656. 
Koechlin, E., Ody, C., Kouneiher, F. (2003). The architecture of cognitive control in the 
human prefrontal cortex. Science. 302, 1181–1184. 
Kohonen, T. (1982). Self-organized formation of topologically correct feature maps. 
Biological Cybernetics, 43, 59-69. 
Kok, P., Jehee, J., & de Lange, P. (2012). Less is more: expectation sharpens 
representations in the primary visual cortex. 
Kritzer, M.F., Goldman-Rakic, P.S. (1995). Intrinsic circuit organization of the major 
layers and sublayers of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the rhesus monkey. J 
Comp Neurol, 359, 131–143. 
Leichnetz, G.R., & Astruc, J. (1975). Preliminary evidence for a direct projection of the 
prefrontal cortex to the hippocampus in the squirrel monkey. Brain, Behavior and 
Evolution, 11(5-6), 355-364. 
Lennie, P. (2003). The cost of cortical computation. Current Biology, 13:493-497. 
Leon, M.I., Shadlen, M.N. (1999). Effect of expected reward magnitude on the response 
of neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of the macaque. Neuron, 24, 415–25. 
Levitt, J.B., Lewis, D.A., Yoshioka, T., & Lund, J.S. (1993). Topography of pyramidal 
neuron intrinsic connections in macaque monkey prefrontal cortex (areas 9 and 46). 
Journal of Comparative Neurology, 338(3), 360-376. 
90 
Lhermitte, F. (1983). “Utilization behaviour” and its relation to lesions of the frontal 
lobes. Brain, 106, 237–55. 
Li, N., & DiCarlo, J. J. (2008). Unsupervised natural experience rapidly alters invariant 
object representation in visual cortex. Science, 321(5895), 1502-1507. 
Logothetis, N.K. (1998). Object vision and visual awareness. Current Opinions in 
Neurobiology, 8(4), 536-44. 
Lucke, J. and Bouecke, J.D. (2005). Dynamics of cortical columns – self-organization of 
receptive fields. Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Neural 
Networks. LNCS 3696:31–37. 
Luria, A.R., Karpv, B.A., & Yarbuss, A.L. (1966). Disturbances of active visual 
perception with lesions of the frontal lobes. Cortex, 2, 202-212. 
Luria, A.R. (1969). Frontal lobe syndromes. In Handbook of Clinical Neurology, ed. P.J. 
Vinken, G.W. Bruyn, pp. 725–57. New York: Elsevier. 
Maltoni, D. (2011). Pattern recognition by hierarchical temporal memory. Technical 
report, DEIS University of Bologna. 
Markram H., Perin R. (2011). Innate neural assemblies for lego memory. Front. Neural 
Circuits 5:6. doi: 10.3389/fncir.2011.00006. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision. A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation 
and Processing of Visual Information. W.H. Freeman, San Francisco. 
Martinez, L.M., Wang, Q., Reid, R.C., Pillai, C., Alonso, J.M., Sommer, F.T., Hirsch, 
J.A. (2005). Receptive field structure varies with layer in the primary visual cortex. 
Nature Neuroscience, 8, 372-379. 
Masquelier, T., Serre, T., Thorpe, S., & Poggio, T. (2007). Learning Complex Cell 
Invariance from Natural Videos: A Plausibility Proof. MIT Center for Biological & 
Computational Learning Paper #269/Mit-csaiLtr #2007-060, Cambridge, MA. 
91 
McClelland, J.L. (1994). The interaction of nature and nurture in development: A parallel 
distributed processing perspective. International perspectives on psychological 
science, 1, 57-88. 
McClelland, J.L & Rumelhart, D.E. (1981). An interactive activation model of context 
effects in letter perception. Part I: an account of basic findings. Psychol. Review, 88, 
375-407. 
McClelland, J.L., Rumelhart, D.E., & the PDP Research Group (Eds.). (1986). Parallel 
Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition , Vol. 2: 
Psychological and Biological Models. MIT Press. 
Mel, B. (1999). Why have dendrites? A computational perspective. Dendrites. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Mesulam, M.M. (1997). Anatomic principles in behavioral neurology and 
neuropsychology. Feinberg, T.E. & Farah, M.J. (Eds.), Behavioral neurology and 
neuropsychology, 55-68. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Miller, E.K., Erickson, C.A., Desimone, R. (1996). Neural mechanisms of visual working 
memory in prefrontal cortex of the macaque. J. Neurosci., 16, 5154–67. 
Miller, E.K., & Cohen, J.D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. 
Annual review of neuroscience, 24(1), 167-202. 
Milner B. (1963). Effects of different brain lesions on card sorting. Arch. Neurol, 9:90. 
Mitchison, G. (1991). Removing time variation with the anti-Hebbian differential 
synapse. Neural Computation, 3, 312–320. 
Miyashita, Y. (1988). Neuronal correlate of visual associate long-term memory in the 
primate temporal cortex. Nature, 335, 817–820. 
Mountcastle, V.B. (1978). An organizing principle for cerebral function: the unit model 
and the distributed system. In G.M. Edelman and V.B. Mountcastle (Eds.), The 
Mindful Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
92 
Mountcastle, V.B. (1997). The columnar organization of the neocortex. Brain, 120, 701-
722. 
Moustafa, A.A., Sherman, S.J. & Frank, M.J. (2008). A dopaminergic basis for working 
memory, learning and attentional shifting in Parkinsonism. Neuropsychologia, 46, 
3144-3156. 
Mumford, D. (1992). On the computational architecture of the neocortex II. Biological 
Cybernetics, 66, 241-251. 
Nagel, I.E., Schumacher, E.H., Goebel, R., & D'Esposito, M. (2008). Functional MRI 
investigation of verbal selection mechanisms in lateral prefrontal cortex. Neuroimage, 
43(4), 801-807. 
Nauta, W.J.H. (1964). Some efferent connections of the prefrontal cortex in the monkey. 
The frontal granular cortex and behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 397-409. 
Newell, A. (1973). 'Production systems: Models of control structures', in Visual 
Information Processing, ed. W.G. Chase, New York, NY: Academic Press, pp. 463–
525. 
Norman, D.A., & Shallice, T. (1980). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control 
of behavior. California Univ. San Diego La Jolla Center for Human Information 
Processing. 
Norman, D.A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control 
of behavior. In Consciousness and self-regulation (ed. G.E. Schwartz & D. Shapiro), 
vol 4. Plenum Press: New York. 
O’Doherty, J., Rolls, E.T., Francis, S., Bowtell, R., McGlone, F. et al. (2000). Sensory-
specific satiety-related olfactory activation of the human orbitofrontal cortex. 
NeuroReport, 11, 893–97. 
Olshausen, B.A., Field, D.J. (1996). Emergence of simple cell receptive field properties 
by learning a sparse code for natural images. Nature, 381, 607-609. 
93 
Olshausen, B. & Field, D. (2004). Sparse coding of sensory inputs. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 14, 481-487. 
O'Reilly, R.C. (1996). Biologically plausible error-driven learning using local activation 
differences: The generalized recirculation algorithm. Neural computation, 8(5), 895-
938. 
O’Reilly, R.C. (2010). The What and How of prefrontal cortical organization. Trends in 
neurosciences, 33(8), 355-361. 
O'Reilly, R.C., Frank, M.J., Hazy, T.E., & Watz, B. (2007). PVLV: the primary value and 
learned value Pavlovian learning algorithm. Behavioral neuroscience, 121(1), 31. 
O'Reilly, R. & Munakata, Y. (2000). Computational explorations in cognitive 
neuroscience. MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. 
O’Reilly, R.C., Munakata, Y., Frank, M.J., Hazy, T.E., & Contributors (2012). 
Computational Cognitive Neuroscience. Wiki Book, 1st Edition, URL: 
http://ccnbook.colorado.edu. 
O’Reilly, R. C., Hazy, T. E., & Herd, S. A. (2012). The Leabra Cognitive Architecture: 
How to Play 20 Principles with Nature and Win! In S. Chipman (Ed) Oxford 
Handbook of Cognitive Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: networks of plausible 
inference. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco. 
Perret, E. (1974). The left frontal lobe of man and the suppression of habitual responses 
in verbal categorical behaviour. Neuropsychologia, 12, 323–30. 
Perrett, D.I., Rolls, E.T., Caan, W. (1982) Visual neurons responsive to faces in the 
monkey temporal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 47(3), 329-342. 
Petrides, M. (1985). Deficits in non-spatial conditional associative learning after 
periarcuate lesions in the monkey. Behav. Brain Res., 16, 95–101. 
Petrides, M. (1990). Nonspatial conditional learning impaired in patients with unilateral 
frontal but not unilateral temporal lobe excisions. Neuropsychologia, 28, 137–49. 
94 
Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct: How the mind creates language, pp. 37–43. W. 
Morrow, New York. 
Pribram, K.H. (1987). The subdivisions of the frontal cortex revisited. In The frontal 
lobes revisited (ed. E. Perecman), pp. 11-39. New York: The IRBN Press. 
Price, J.L. (1999). Prefrontal cortical networks related to visceral function and mood. 
Ann. NY Acad. Sci., 877, 383–96. 
Price, R. W. (2011). Hierarchical temporal memory cortical learning algorithm for 
pattern recognition on multi-core architectures. M.Sc. thesis, Portland State 
University.  
Ranzato, M. Huang, F., Boureau, Y., LeCun, Y. (2007). Unsupervised Learning of 
Invariant Feature Hierarchies with Applications to Object Recognition. Proc. 
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2007. 
Rao, R. & Ballard, D. (1997). Dynamic model of visual recognition predicts neural 
response properties in the visual cortex. Neural Computation, 9, 721-763. 
Rao, R.P., and Ballard, D.H. (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional 
interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nat. Neurosci., 2, 79–87. 
Rao, S.G., Williams, G.V., & Goldman-Rakic, P.S. (1999). Isodirectional tuning of 
adjacent interneurons and pyramidal cells during working memory: evidence for 
microcolumnar organization in PFC. Journal of Neurophysiology, 81(4), 1903-1916. 
Redgrave, P., Prescott, T.J., & Gurney, K. (1999). The basal ganglia: a vertebrate 
solution to the selection problem?. Neuroscience, 89(4), 1009-1023. 
Rescorla, R.A., & Wagner, A.R. (1972). A theory of Pavlovian conditioning: Variation in 
the effectiveness of reinforcement and nonreinforcement. In A. H. Black & W. F. 
Prokasy (Eds.), Classical conditioning II: Theory and research (pp. 64–99). New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
Riesenhuber, M. & Poggio, T. (1999). Hierarchical models of object recognition in  
cortex. Nat Neurosci, 2, 1019–1025. 
95 
Rockel, A.J., Hiorns, R.W., Powell, T.P.S. (1980). The basic uniformity in structure of 
the neocortex. Brain 103, 221–244. 
Rodriguez, A., Whitson, J., Granger, R. (2005). Derivation and analysis of basic 
computational operations of thalamocortical circuits. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 16, 856-877. 
Rosene, D.L., & Van Hoesen, G.W. (1977). Hippocampal efferents reach widespread 
areas of cerebral cortex and amygdala in the rhesus monkey. Science, 198(4314), 
315-317. 
Rossi, A.F., Rotter, P.S., Desimone, R., & Ungerleider, L.G. (1999). Prefrontal lesions 
produce impairments in feature-cued attention. Soc. Neurosci. Abst., 25, 3. 
Rumelhart, D.E., Hinton, G.E., & Williams, R.J. (1986). Learning representations by 
back-propagating errors. Nature, 323(6088), 533–536. 
Rumelhart, D.E., McClelland, J.L., & the PDP Research Group (Eds.). (1986b). Parallel 
Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition, Vol.1: 
Foundations , Vol. 1: Foundations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Rumelhart, D.E., & Zipser, D. (1985). Feature discovery by competitive learning. 
Cognitive science, 9(1), 75-112. 
Rushworth, M.F., Behrens, T.E. (2008). Choice, uncertainty and value in prefrontal and 
cingulate cortex. Nat Neurosci, 11, 389 –397. 
Saffran, J. R., Newport, E. L., & Aslin, R. N. (1996a). Word segmentation: the role of 
distributional cues. Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 606-621. 
Saffran, J. R., Aslin, R. N., & Newport, E. L. (1996b). Statistical learning by 8-month-old 
infants. Science, 274, 1926-1928.  
Saffran, J. R., Johnson, E. K., Aslin, R. N. & Newport, E. L. (1999). Statistical learning 
of tone sequences by human infants and adults. Cognition, 70, 27-52. 
Saffran, J. R. & Wilson, D. P. (2003). From syllables to syntax: multilevel statistical 
learning by 12-month-old infants. Infancy, 4, 273-284. 
96 
Schacter, D.L. (1997). The cognitive neuroscience of memory: perspectives from 
neuroimaging research. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London Ser. B, 352, 1689–95. 
Schmaltz, L.W., & Isaacson, R.L. (1968). Effects of caudate and frontal lesions on 
retention and relearning of a DRL schedule. Journal of Comparative and 
Physiological Psychology, 65(2), 343. 
Schneider, B.A., Ghose G.M. (2012). Temporal production signals in parietal cortex. 
PLoS Biology 10(10), e1001413. 
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. J. Neurophysiol., 80, 
1–27. 
Schultz, W., Apicella, P., Ljungberg, T. (1993). Responses of monkey dopamine neurons 
to reward and conditioned stimuli during successive steps of learning a delayed 
response task. J. Neurosci. 13, 900–13. 
Schultz, W., Dickinson, A. (2000). Neuronal coding of prediction errors. Annu. Rev. 
Neurosci., 23, 473–500. 
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., Montague, P.R. (1997). A neural substrate of prediction and 
reward. Science 275, 1593–99. 
Shallice T. (1982). Specific impairments of planning. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London Ser. 
B, 298, 199–209. 
Shallice, T. & Burgess, P. (1991). Higher-order cognitive impairments and frontal lobe 
lesions in man. In H.S. Levin, H.M. Eisenberg & A.L. Benton (Eds.), Frontal lobe 
function and dysfunction (Ch. 6, pp.125-138). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Shallice, T. & Burgess, P. (1996). The domain of supervisory processes and temporal 
organization of behaviour. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London Ser. B, 351, 1405–11. 
Sherman, S.M., & Guillery, R.W. (2001). Exploring the thalamus. San Diego: Academic 
Press. 
Serre, T., Kouh, M., Cadieu, C., Knoblich, U., Kreiman, G., & Poggio, T. (2005). A 
Theory of Object Recognition: Computations and Circuits in the Feedforward Path of 
97 
the Ventral Stream in Primate Visual Cortex. MIT AI Memo 2005-036 / CBCL Memo 
259, AI Memo 2005-036 / CBCL Memo 259 2005. Cambridge, MA. 
Serre, T., Wolf, L., Bileschi, S., Riesenhuber, M., & Poggio, T. (2007). Object 
recognition with cortex-like mechanisms. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and 
Machine Intelligence 29(3), 411–426.  
Serre, T., Oliva, A., & Poggio, T. (2007). A feedforward architecture accounts for rapid 
categorization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(15), 6424–
6429.  
Stewart, T.C., Bekolay, T., & Eliasmith, C. (2012). Learning to select actions with 
spiking neurons in the basal ganglia. Frontiers in neuroscience, 6. 
Strick, P.L. (1976). Anatomical analysis of ventrolateral thalamic input to primate motor 
cortex. Journal of neurophysiology, 39(5), 1020-1031. 
Srinivasan, M. V., Laughlin, S. B. & Dubs A. (1982). Predictive coding: A fresh view of 
inhibition in the retina. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 216, 427–459. 
Sutton, R.S. (1988). Learning to predict by the method of temporal differences. Machine 
Learning, 3, 9–44. 
Sutton, R.S., & Barto, A.G. (1998). Reinforcement learning: An introduction. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Swanson, L.W. (2000). Cerebral hemisphere regulation of motivated behavior. Brain 
research, 886(1), 113-164. 
Tanaka, K. (1996). Inferotemporal cortex and object vision. Annual Review of 
Neuroscience, 19, 109-139. 
Thornton, J., Main, L. & Srbic, A. (2012). Fixed Frame Temporal Pooling. Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science. 7691, 707-718. 
Todorovic, A., van Ede, F., Maris, E., & de Lange, F.P. (2011). Prior expectation 
mediates neural adaptation to repeated sounds in the auditory cortex: an MEG study. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 31, 9118–9123. 
98 
Tsunoda, K., Yamane, Y., Nishizaki, M. & Tanifuji, M. (2001). Complex objects are 
represented in macaque inferotemporal cortex by the combination of feature columns. 
Nature Neuroscience, 4, 832–838. 
Tyler, R.H. (1969). Disorders of visual scanning with frontal lobe lesions. In: Modern 
Neurology, edited by Locke, S., pp.381-393. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 
Urakubo, H., Honda, M., Froemke, R.C., & Kuroda, S. (2008). Requirement of an 
allosteric kinetics of NMDA receptors for spike timing-dependent plasticity. The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 28(13), 3310–3323. 
Vendrell, P., Junque, C., Pujol, J., Jurado, M.A., Molet, J., Grafman, J. (1995). The role 
of prefrontal regions in the Stroop task. Neuropsychologia, 33, 341–52. 
Venkatraman, V., Rosati, A. G., Taren, A. A., & Huettel, S. A. (2009). Resolving 
response, decision, and strategic control: evidence for a functional topography in 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 29(42), 13158-13164. 
Wacongne, C., Labyt, E., van Wassenhove, V., Bekinschtein, T., Naccache, L., & 
Dehaene, S. (2011). Evidence for a hierarchy of predictions and prediction errors in 
human cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 20754–20759. 
Wallis, G. & Bulthoff, H.H. (2001). Effects of temporal association on recognition 
memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 98, 4800–4804. 
Wallis, J.D., Anderson, K.C., & Miller, E.K. (2001). Single neurons in prefrontal cortex 
encode abstract rules. Nature, 411(6840), 953-956. 
Wallis, G. & Rolls, E. (1997). Invariant face and object recognition in the visual system. 
Progress in Neurobiology, 51, 167-194. 
Wang, X.J. (1999). Synaptic basis of cortical persistent activity: The importance of 
NMDA receptors to working memory. Journal of Neuroscience, 19, 9587. 
Watanabe, M. (1996). Reward expectancy in primate prefrontal neurons. Nature, 382, 
629–32. 
99 
Wikmark, R.G.E., Divac, I., & Weiss, R. (1973). Retention of spatial delayed alternation 
in rats with lesions in the frontal lobes. Brain, behavior and evolution, 8(5), 329-339. 
Willshaw, D. & Dayan, P. (1990). Optimal plasticity from matrix memories: what goes 
up must come down. Neural Computation 2, 85-93. 
Wood, J.N., & Grafman, J. (2003). Human prefrontal cortex: processing and 
representational perspectives. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(2), 139-147. 
Wurtz, R.H., Mohler, C.W. (1976). Enhancement of visual responses in monkey striate 
cortex and frontal eye fields. J. Neurophysiol., 39, 766–72. 
Yener, G. G., & Zaffos, A. (1999). Memory and the frontal lobes. The human frontal 
lobes: Functions and disorders, 288-303. 
Zhang, Y., Meyers, E., Bichot, N., Serre, T., Poggio, T., & Desimone, R. (2011). Object 
decoding with attention in inferior temporal cortex. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 108(21), 8850-8855. 
Zhou, X. & Luo, Y. (2013). Implementation of Hierarchical Temporal Memory on a 
Many-core Architecture. Ph.D. dissertation, Halmstad University. 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  CLA columns.  Each cell in a particular column represents the same 
feedforward input, but within a different temporal context. Active cells are shown in light 
grey, predictive cells in dark grey. If a column is activated by feedforward input when it 
had one or more cells in predictive state, then only those cells become active. Otherwise, 
all cells in the column are activated. Adapted from Hawkins et al, 2010. 
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Figure 2. CLA visual invariance. A) The same feature appearing at different locations in 
the visual field results in different sparse distributed patterns of activity (orange) due to 
competitive Hebbian learning.  Because the different spatial locations of this same feature 
would tend to occur sequentially with high probability, the CLA would learn to predict 
each of them when it receives any of them as input.  B) After learning, when the CLA 
receives one of the spatial locations of this feature as input, it will predictively activate 
(yellow) representations of the others as well.  This results in a degree of overlap between 
the representations of this feature at different nearby spatial location.  
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Figure 3. Parallel frontal cortico-thalamic relays. A) Cortical areas that project to the 
striatum, providing information that is used to control each relay. B) The target area of 
each cortico-thalamic relay. Note that information from across the cortex is used to 
control the relays, but all of the relay targets are frontal areas. 
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Figure 4. Sequence of events in the Badre et al (2010) hierarchical reinforcement 
learning task. Presentation of stimulus is followed by a green fixation cross. The stimulus 
is composed of one of three object shapes at one of three orientations, framed in a square 
of one of two colors. After the participant responds by pressing one of three buttons, 
there is a variable delay followed by auditory feedback indicating whether the response 
was correct. Adapted from Frank & Badre, 2012.
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Figure 5. Badre et al (2010) hierarchical task condition. While stimulus-response 
mappings are arbitrary in the flat condition, in the hierarchical condition the mappings are 
dependant on the color of the framing square. In this example, in the presence of a red 
square, only object shape determines the mapping; in the presence of a blue square, only 
object orientation determines the mapping. Adapted from Frank & Badre, 2012. 
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Figure 6. An example state of the Frank & Badre (2012) network. Arrows correspond to 
projections, circles correspond to basal ganglia gating effects, and dashed red arrows 
reflect hierarchical flow of control. Stimulus shape, orientation, and square color is 
represented in the visual input area. The input gate has learned to gate shape and 
orientation information into PMd maintain, and the prePMd gate has learned to gate 
square color into prePMd output. The output gate has learned that when color 2 is 
maintained in prePMd output, the shape information should be gated through from PMd 
maintain to PMd output. The response gate has learned to select button press 1 in 
response to the context of shape 3, which it receives from PMd output. Adapted from 
Frank & Badre, 2012. 
 
 
